Considerations of a Representative Government | Page 3

Men
did not wake on a summer morning and find them sprung up. Neither
do they resemble trees, which, once planted, "are aye growing" while
men "are sleeping." In every stage of their existence they are made
what they are by human voluntary agency. Like all things, therefore,
which are made by men, they may be either well or ill made; judgment
and skill may have been exercised in their production, or the reverse of
these. And again, if a people have omitted, or from outward pressure
have not had it in their power to give themselves a constitution by the
tentative process of applying a corrective to each evil as it arose, or as

the sufferers gained strength to resist it, this retardation of political
progress is no doubt a great disadvantage to them, but it does not prove
that what has been found good for others would not have been good
also for them, and will not be so still when they think fit to adopt it.
On the other hand, it is also to be borne in mind that political
machinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to be
worked, by men, and even by ordinary men. It needs, not their simple
acquiescence, but their active participation; and must be adjusted to the
capacities and qualities of such men as are available. This implies three
conditions. The people for whom the form of government is intended
must be willing to accept it, or, at least not so unwilling as to oppose an
insurmountable obstacle to its establishment. They must be willing and
able to do what is necessary to keep it standing. And they must be
willing and able to do what it requires of them to enable it to fulfill its
purposes. The word "do" is to be understood as including forbearances
as well as acts. They must be capable of fulfilling the conditions of
action and the conditions of self-restraint, which are necessary either
for keeping the established polity in existence, or for enabling it to
achieve the ends, its conduciveness to which forms its
recommendation.
The failure of any of these conditions renders a form of government,
whatever favorable promise it may otherwise hold out, unsuitable to the
particular case.
The first obstacle, the repugnance of the people to the particular form
of government, needs little illustration, because it never can in theory
have been overlooked. The case is of perpetual occurrence. Nothing but
foreign force would induce a tribe of North American Indians to submit
to the restraints of a regular and civilized government. The same might
have been said, though somewhat less absolutely, of the barbarians who
overran the Roman Empire. It required centuries of time, and an entire
change of circumstances, to discipline them into regular obedience
even to their own leaders, when not actually serving under their banner.
There are nations who will not voluntarily submit to any government
but that of certain families, which have from time immemorial had the

privilege of supplying them with chiefs. Some nations could not, except
by foreign conquest, be made to endure a monarchy; others are equally
averse to a republic. The hindrance often amounts, for the time being,
to impracticability.
But there are also cases in which, though not averse to a form of
government--possibly even desiring it--a people may be unwilling or
unable to fulfill its conditions. They may be incapable of fulfilling such
of them as are necessary to keep the government even in nominal
existence. Thus a people may prefer a free government; but if, from
indolence, or carelessness, or cowardice, or want of public spirit, they
are unequal to the exertions necessary for preserving it; if they will not
fight for it when it is directly attacked; if they can be deluded by the
artifices used to cheat them out of it; if, by momentary discouragement,
or temporary panic, or a fit of enthusiasm for an individual, they can be
induced to lay their liberties at the feet even of a great man, or trust him
with powers which enable him to subvert their institutions--in all these
cases they are more or less unfit for liberty; and though it may be for
their good to have had it even for a short time, they are unlikely long to
enjoy it. Again, a people may be unwilling or unable to fulfill the duties
which a particular form of government requires of them. A rude people,
though in some degree alive to the benefits of civilized society, may be
unable to practice the forbearances which it demands; their passions
may be too violent, or their personal pride too exacting, to forego
private conflict, and leave to the laws the avenging of their real or
supposed