Christianity and Ethics | Page 7

which life is to be
regulated. This is sometimes expressed by saying that Ethics treats of
what ought to be. The ideal must not be one which simply floats in the
air. It must be an ideal which is possible, and, therefore, as such,
obligatory. It is useless to feel the worth of a certain idea, or even to
speak of the desirability of it, if we do not feel also that it ought to be
realised. Moral judgments imply an 'ought,' and that 'ought' implies a
norm or standard, in the light of which, as a criterion, all obligation
must be tested, and according to which all conduct must be regulated.
3. Ethics, once more, is concerned with the will. It is based specifically
on the fact that man is not only an intellectual being (capable of
knowing) and a sensitive being (possessed of feeling) but also a
volitional being; that is, a being endowed with self-determining activity.
It implies that man is responsible for his intentions, dispositions and
actions. The idea of a supreme ideal at which he is to aim and a norm or
standard of conduct according to which he ought to regulate his life,
would have no meaning if we did not presuppose the power of
self-determination. {13} Whatever is not willed has no moral value.
Where there is no freedom of choice, we cannot speak of an action as
either good or evil.[1] When we praise or blame a man's conduct we do
so under the assumption that his action is voluntary. In all moral action
purpose is implied. This is the meaning of the well-known dictum of
Kant, 'There is nothing in the world . . . that can be called good without

qualification except a good will. A good will is good, not because of
what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of
some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition.'[2] It is the
inner aim, the good will which alone gives moral worth to any
endeavour. It is not what I do but the reason why I do it which is
chiefly of ethical value. The essence of virtue resides in the will, not in
the achievement; in the intention or motive, not in the result.
III. The propriety of styling Ethics a science has sometimes been
questioned. Science, it is said, has to do with certain necessary and
uniform facts of experience; its object is simply to trace effects from
causes and to formulate laws according to which sequences inevitably
result from certain ascertained causes or observed facts. But is not
character, with which Ethics confessedly deals, just that concerning
which no definite conclusions can be predicted? Is not conduct,
dependent as it is on the human will, just the element in man which
cannot be explained as the resultant of calculable forces? If the will is
free, and is the chief factor in the moulding of life, then you cannot
forecast what line conduct will take or predict what shape character will
assume. The whole conception of Ethics as a science must, it is
contended, fall to the ground, if we admit a variable and incalculable
element in conduct.
Some writers, on this account, are disposed to regard Ethics as an art
rather than a science, and indeed, like every normative science, it may
be regarded as lying midway between them. A science may be said to
teach us to know {14} and an art to do: but as has been well remarked,
'a normative science teaches to know how to do.'[3] Ethics may indeed
be regarded both as a science and an art. In so far as it examines and
explains certain phenomena of character it is a science: but in so far as
it attempts to regulate human conduct by instruction and advice it is an
art.[4] Yet when all is said, in so far as Ethics has to do with the
volitional side of man,--with decisions and acts of will,--there must be
something indeterminate and problematic in it which precludes it from
being designated an exact science. A certain variableness belongs to
character, and conduct cannot be pronounced good or bad without
reference to the acting subject. Actions cannot be wholly explained by

law, and a large portion of human life (and that the highest and noblest)
eludes analysis. A human being is not simply a part of the world. He is
able to break in upon the sequence of events and set in motion new
forces whose effects neither he himself nor his fellows can estimate. It
is the unique quality of rational beings that in great things and in small
things they act from ideas. The magic power of thought cannot be
exaggerated. Great conceptions have great consequences, and