Chancellorsville and Gettysburg | Page 8

to move in any direction except to the rear.
General Lee formed his line with Wickham's and Owens' regiments of cavalry on his right, opposite Meade's corps, supported by Perry's brigade of Anderson's division; Jackson's line stretched from the Plank Road around toward the Furnace.
Before night set in, Wright and Stuart attacked an outlying part of Slocum's corps and drove it in on the main body. They then brought up some artillery and opened fire against Slocum's position on the crest of the hill. Failing to make any impression they soon retired and all was quiet once more.
The enemy soon posted batteries on the high ground a mile east of Chancellorsville, and opened on Hancock's front with considerable effect. They also enfiladed Geary's division of Slocum's corps, and became very annoying, but Knap's battery of the Twelfth Corps replied effectively and kept their fire down to a great extent.
As the Union army was hidden by a thick undergrowth, Lee spent the rest of the day in making a series of feigned attacks to ascertain where our troops were posted.
When night set in, the sound of the axe was heard in every direction, for both armies thought it prudent to strengthen their front as much as possible.
The prospect for Lee as darkness closed over the scene was far from encouraging. He had examined the position of the Union army carefully, and had satisfied himself that as regards its centre and left it was unassailable. Let any man with a musket on his shoulder, encumbered with a cartridge-box, haversack, canteen, etc., attempt to climb over a body of felled timber to get at an enemy who is coolly shooting at him from behind a log breastwork, and he will realize the difficulty of forcing a way through such obstacles. Our artillery, too, swept every avenue of approach, so that the line might be considered as almost impregnable. Before giving up the attack, however, Stuart was directed to cautiously reconnoitre on the right, where Howard was posted, and see if there was not a vulnerable point there.
CHAPTER III.
THE DISASTROUS SECOND OF MAY.
At dawn of day General Lee and General Jackson were sitting by the side of the plank road, on some empty cracker boxes, discussing the situation, when Stuart came up and reported the result of his reconnoissance. He said the right flank of Howard's corps was defenceless and easily assailable. Jackson at once asked permission to take his own corps--about 26,000 muskets--make a detour through the woods to conceal his march from observation, and fall unexpectedly upon the weak point referred to by Stuart. It was a startling proposition and contrary to all the principles of strategy, for when Jackson was gone Lee would be left with but a few men to withstand the shock of Hooker's entire army, and might be driven back to Fredericksburg or crushed. If the Eleventh Corps had prepared for Jackson's approach by a line properly fortified, with redoubts on the flanks, the men protected in front by felled timber and sheltered by breastworks, with the artillery at the angles, crossing its fire in front, Jackson's corps would have been powerless to advance, and could have been held as in a vise, while Lee, one- half of his force being absent, would have found himself helpless against the combined attack of our other corps, which could have assailed him in front and on each flank.
There was, therefore, great risk in attempting such a manoeuvre, for nothing short of utter blindness on the part of the Union commanders could make it successful.
Still, something had to be done, for inaction would result in a retreat, and in the present instance, if the worst came to the worst, Jackson could fall back on Gordonsville, and Lee toward the Virginia Central Railroad, where they could reunite their columns by rail, before Hooker could march across the country and prevent the junction. Jackson received the required permission, and started off at once by a secluded road, keeping Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade of cavalry between his column and the Union army to shield his march from observation.
At 2 A.M., Hooker sent orders for the First Corps, under Reynolds, to which I belonged, to take up its bridges and join him by way of United States Ford, and by 9 A.M. we were on our way.
The first sound of battle came from some guns posted on the eminence from which Hancock had retreated the day before. A battery there opened fire on the army trains which had been parked in the open plain in front of the Chancellorsville House, and drove them pell mell to the rear.
At dawn Hooker rode around, accompanied by Sickles, to inspect his lines. He approved the position generally, but upon Sickles' recommendation he threw in a division of the Third