Chancellorsville and Gettysburg | Page 5

the enemy would not attack the bridge heads, they being well guarded by artillery on the north bank, so Sickles' corps was detached on the 30th and ordered to Chancellorsville.
Sedgwick used the remainder of his men to great advantage by marching them back and forth among the hills in such a way as to lead Lee to suppose that a very large force confronted him. As, however, Sedgwick did not advance, and more accurate reports were furnished by Stuart in relation to what had taken place up the river, Lee saw, on the night of the 30th, that the movement in front of Fredericksburg was a feint, and his real antagonist was at Chancellorsville. He had previously ordered Jackson's corps up from Moss Creek and now advanced with the main body of his army to meet Hooker, leaving Early's division of Jackson's corps and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division of Longstreet's corps to hold the heights of Fredericksburg against Sedgwick. Jackson, who was always prompt, started at midnight, and at 8 A.M. the next day stood by the side of Anderson at Tabernacle Church. McLaws' division had already arrived, having preceded him by a few hours.
The error in the movement thus far made is plain. It is a maxim in war that a single hour's delay, when an enemy is strengthening his position or when reinforcements are coming up, will frequently cost the lives of a thousand men. In the present instance it was simply suicidal for Hooker to delay action until Anderson had fortified his lines and Lee had come forward with the main body to join him. Hooker should have pressed on immediately to seize the objective. Banks' Ford was almost within his grasp, and only a portion of Anderson's division barred the way. The possession of that ford would have brought Sedgwick twelve miles nearer to him, and would have forced Lee to fight at a great disadvantage both as to position and numbers. Hooker knew from a captured despatch which Pleasonton placed in his hands, that Lee was still in Fredericksburg on the 30th, uncertain how to act; for he did not know the strength of Sedgwick's column, and feared that the main attack might come from that direction. The four corps at Chancellorsville amounted to about forty-six thousand men; and 18,000 more were close at hand under Sickles. The troops had made but a short march, and were comparatively fresh. Four miles further on lay the great prize for which Hooker was contending. He had only to put out his hand to reach it, but he delayed action all that long night and until eleven o'clock of the next morning. When he did make the effort the line he was about to occupy was well fortified and held by all but one division and one brigade of Lee's army.
CHAPTER II.
FRIDAY, THE FIRST OF MAY.
There are two excellent roads leading from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg--one a plank road, which keeps up near the sources of the streams along the dividing line between Mott Run on the north and Lewis Creek and Massaponax Creek on the South, and the other called the old turnpike, which was more direct but more broken, as it passed over several ravines. There was still a third road, a very poor one, which ran near the river and came out at Banks' Ford.
On May 1st, at 11 A.M., Hooker moved out to attack Lee in four columns.
Slocum's corps, followed by that of Howard, took the plank road on the right.
Sykes' division of Meade's corps, followed by Hancock's division of Couch's corps, went by the turnpike in the centre.
The remainder of Meade's corps--Griffin's division, followed by that of Humphreys--took the river road.
Lastly, French's division of Couch's corps was under orders to turn off and march to Todd's Tavern.
Each column was preceded by a detachment of Pleasonton's cavalry, which, in fact, had been close to Anderson's pickets all the morning.
Before these troops started, Sickles' corps arrived, after a short march, from Hartwood Church, and were posted in rear of the Chancellorsville House as a reserve, with one brigade thrown out to Dowdall's Tavern, otherwise known as Melzi Chancellor's house. Another brigade was left at the Ford to guard the passage against Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry.
Hooker, who was a very sanguine man, expected to be able to form line of battle by 2 P.M., with his right resting near Tabernacle Church, and his left covering Banks' Ford. It did not seem to occur to him that the enemy might be there before him and prevent the formation, or that he would have any difficulty in moving and deploying his troops; but he soon found himself hampered in every direction by dense and almost impenetrable thickets, which had a tendency to break up every organization that tried