belonged, to take up its bridges and join him by way of United
States Ford, and by 9 A.M. we were on our way.
The first sound of battle came from some guns posted on the eminence
from which Hancock had retreated the day before. A battery there
opened fire on the army trains which had been parked in the open plain
in front of the Chancellorsville House, and drove them pell mell to the
rear.
At dawn Hooker rode around, accompanied by Sickles, to inspect his
lines. He approved the position generally, but upon Sickles'
recommendation he threw in a division of the Third Corps between the
Eleventh and Twelfth, as he thought the interval too great there.
As soon as Jackson was en route, Lee began to demonstrate against our
centre and left, to make Hooker believe the main attack was to be there,
and to prevent him from observing the turning column in its progress
toward the right. A vigorous cannonade began against Meade, and a
musketry fire was opened on Couch and Slocum; the heaviest attack
being on Hancock's position, which was in advance of the main line.
In spite of every precaution, Jackson's column as it moved southward
was seen to pass over a bare hill about a mile and a half from Birney's
front, and its numbers were pretty accurately estimated. General Birney
at once reported this important fact at General Hooker's headquarters. It
is always pleasant to think your adversary is beaten, and Hooker
thought at first Jackson might be retreating on Gordonsville. It was
evident enough that he was either doing that or making a circuit to
attack Howard. To provide for the latter contingency the following
order was issued:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
CHANCELLORSVILLE, Va., May 2, 1863, 9.30 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SLOCUM AND MAJOR-GENERAL
HOWARD:
I am directed by the Major-General Commanding to say that the
disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a
front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank,
he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the positions
you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in
whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy
reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line
does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defences worth
naming have been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity of
troops at that point, and not, in the General's opinion, as favorably
posted as might be.
We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right.
Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may
be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach.
(Signed) JAMES H. VAN ALLEN, Brigadier-General and
Aide-de-camp.
For what subsequently occurred Hooker was doubtless highly
censurable, but it was not unreasonable for him to suppose, after giving
these orders to a corps commander, that they would be carried out, and
that minor combats far out on the roads would precede and give ample
notice of Jackson's approach in time to reinforce that part of the line.
When the enemy were observed, Sickles went out with Clark's battery
and an infantry support to shell their train. This had the effect of
driving them off of that road on to another which led in the same
direction, but was less exposed, as it went through the woods. A second
reconnoissance was sent to see if the movement continued. Sickles then
obtained Hooker's consent to start out with two divisions to attack
Jackson's corps in flank and cut if off from the main body.
Sickles started on this mission at 1 P.M. with Birney's division,
preceded by Randolph's battery. As Jackson might turn on him with his
whole force, Whipple's division of his own corps reinforced his left,
and Barlow's brigade of the Eleventh Corps his right. He was greatly
delayed by the swamps and the necessity of building bridges, but
finally crossed Lewis Creek and reached the road upon which Jackson
was marching. He soon after, by the efforts of Berdan's sharpshooters,
surrounded and captured the 23d Georgia regiment, which had been left
to watch the approaches from our lines. Information obtained from
prisoners showed the Jackson could not be retreating, and that his
object was to strike a blow somewhere.
Birney's advance, and the capture of the 23d Georgia were met by
corresponding movements on the part of the enemy. A rebel battery
was established on the high ground at the Welford House, which
checked Birney's progress until it was silenced by Livingston's battery,
which was brought forward for that purpose. Pleansonton's cavalry was
now sent to the Foundry as an additional
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