Chancellorsville and Gettysburg | Page 6

was a very sanguine man, expected to be able to form line
of battle by 2 P.M., with his right resting near Tabernacle Church, and
his left covering Banks' Ford. It did not seem to occur to him that the
enemy might be there before him and prevent the formation, or that he
would have any difficulty in moving and deploying his troops; but he
soon found himself hampered in every direction by dense and almost
impenetrable thickets, which had a tendency to break up every
organization that tried to pass through them into mere crowds of men
without order or alignment. Under these circumstances concert of

action became exceedingly difficult, and when attempts were made to
communicate orders off the roads, aids wandered hopelessly through
the woods, struggling in the thick undergrowth, without being able to
find any one. It was worse then fighting in a dense fog.* The enemy, of
course, were also impeded in their movements, but they had the
advantage of being better acquainted with the country, and in case they
were beaten they had a line at Tabernacle Church already intrenched to
fall back upon. The ravines also, which crossed the upper roads at right
angles, offered excellent defensive positions for them.
[* One brigade of Griffin's division was out all night trying to find its
way through the thickets, and did not reach the main army until 4 A.M.
Wilcox's brigade, which came the next day from Banks' Ford to
reinforce the enemy, had a similar experience.]
McLaws, who had advanced on the turnpike, managed to form line of
battle with his division on each side of the pike, against Sykes, who had
now come forward to sustain his cavalry detachment, which, in spite of
their gallantry--for they rode up and fired in the faces of the
enemy--were driven in by the 11th Virginia Infantry of Mahone's
brigade. Jackson on his arrival, had stopped the fortifying which
Anderson had commenced, and according to his invariable custom to
find and fight his enemy as soon as possible, had moved forward; so
that the two armies encountered each other about two and half miles
from Chancellorsville. Sykes indeed, met the advance of McLaws'
division only a mile out, and drove it back steadily a mile farther, when
it was reinforced by Anderson's division, and Ramseur's brigade of
Rodes' division. Anderson gave Sykes a lively fight and succeeded in
getting in on his flanks; for, owing to the divergence of the roads,
neither Slocum on the right nor Meade's two divisions on the left were
abreast with him. He tried to connect with Slocum by throwing out a
regiment deployed as skirmishers, but did not succeed. As the enemy
were gaining the advantage he fell back behind Hancock, who came to
the front and took his place. Slocum now formed on the right, with his
left resting on the plank road, and his right on high ground which
commanded the country around. Altogether the general line was a good
one; for there were large open spaces where the artillery could move

and manoeuvre, and the army were almost out of the thickets. The
reserves could have struggled through those in the rear, and have filled
the gaps, so that there is no reason to suppose our forces could have not
continued to advance, or at all events have held the position, which,
from its elevation and the other advantages I have stated, was an
important one, especially as the column on the river road was in sight
of Banks' Ford, which it could have seized and held, or have struck the
right flank of the enemy with great effect. The troops had come out to
obtain possession of Banks' Ford, and all the surplus artillery was
waiting there. To retreat without making any adequate effort to carry
out his plans made the General appear timid, and had a bad effect on
the morale of the army. It would have been time enough to fall back in
case of defeat; and if such a result was anticipated, the engineers with
their 4,000 men, aided by Sickles' corps, could easily have laid out a
strong line in the rear for the troops to fall back upon. General Warren,
the Chief Engineer on Hooker's staff, thought the commanding ridge
with the open space in front, upon which Hancock was posted, a very
advantageous position for the army to occupy, and urged Couch not to
abandon it until he (Warren) had conferred with Hooker. After the
order came to retire, Couch sent to obtain permission to remain, but it
was peremptorily refused. Hooker soon afterward changed his mind
and countermanded his first order, but it was then too late; our troops
had left the ridge and the enemy were in possession of it.