Chamberss Edinburgh Journal, No. 430 | Page 2

we
take no time for consideration, we shall be apt to plunge into an error,
and afterwards persevere in it for the sake of consistency, or because it
has become a thing which we regard as our own. In such circumstances,
no wonder there are as many 'minds' as 'men.' But when any one can
speak on the ground of well-ascertained facts, and after some
deliberation on the bearings of the question, he must carry others with
him, not by fascination, but by real conviction, and thus greatly reduce

the proportion of opinions to men. Very likely, some other man has got
hold of a somewhat different range of facts, and come to different
conclusions: he, too, will have his party of followers. But there being
two or three discrepant views on the subject, is a much less evil than
there being as many as there are individuals.
The right of pronouncing upon public affairs is one that would be
particularly clung to if there were any danger of its being lost, and it
certainly is not in England that any writer would be found ready to
challenge so valued a privilege. At the same time, no one will seriously
deny, that if this right were used more generally with the advantage of a
tolerable knowledge of the subject, it would be an improvement. Public
men may be acting, as, indeed, they must generally do, upon certain
data carefully brought out by inquiry: they may judge and act amiss
after all, for human judgment is fallible. But when we contrast their
means of forming a judgment with those of many persons who hesitate
not to pronounce upon their measures, it cannot be denied that they
stand in a strong position. When we hear a bold condemnation of their
acts from men who, so far from having gone through the same process
of inquiry, have not even perused the documents in which the grounds
of the administrative policy were explained, can we do otherwise than
smile at the pretensions of the pseudo-judges? Is not the frequency of
this unfounded judging much more apt to harden an unlucky statesman
than to make him amenable to counsel? On the other hand, when a
public man finds himself and his actions criticised by men who have
knowledge, he must be a hardy one indeed who can entirely disregard
the judgment.
If we attentively study the progress of any man who has acquired
influence over his fellow-creatures--apart from certain matters in which
the feelings are mainly concerned--we shall find that he has
distinguished himself by a habit of not pronouncing where he has no
means of forming a judgment. Such a man has had the good sense to
see and confess that he could not be expected to know many things
sufficiently well to entitle him to pronounce authoritatively upon them.
He has probably given some considerable share of attention to certain
subjects that are of some importance to his fellow-creatures, and thus

fitted himself, with regard to them, to speak with more or less decision.
Never found guilty of giving a vague, crudely-formed judgment on
things a hundred miles out of his way, but, on the contrary, obtaining
credit occasionally for the manner in which he treats those with which
he is conversant, he irresistibly acquires character and influence. Young
hasty minds laugh at his taking such care not to commit himself: he is
perhaps taxed with getting credit for merely looking grave and holding
his tongue. But this very holding of the tongue when there is nothing to
say, is, in reality, one of the greatest, though often one of the
last-learned virtues. Were his merits purely negative, they would be
great; tending as they do to save truth from that obscuration which a
multitude of ill-formed opinions necessarily throw upon it. But we shall
usually discover in such men a positive merit also in their power to
illustrate and give a guiding opinion upon certain subjects of
importance to public or private interests.
There is not one sentence in this little essay which may not be justly set
down as mere commonplace. We acknowledge the fault; but defend it
on the ground that sound and useful commonplaces require a continual
refreshing and re-presentment, so many persons being, after all,
unaware or forgetful of them.
On a similar ground of defence, we would take leave to remind
mankind of the good old maxim, 'Hear the other party.' Familiar to
most people, observed by some, there are multitudes who uniformly act
as if they had never heard of it. To be quite candid, we often catch
ourselves neglecting it; and always, at the best, it takes a struggle to
make it a reality in our conduct. Experience, however, impresses us
more and more with a sense