CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 9

did not want their weapons in the
hands of the unstable and dangerous Viaux. Indeed, one message
directly discounts Viaux's exhortations that his group "did not like
killing." [82]
Did Kissinger actually order an end to contact with Viaux? The
evidence shows that he ordered Viaux to stand down at least over the
short term. Did Kissinger intend Track II to end, as he has testified?
Probably, but that was at a time when the White House, 40 Committee,
Track II staff, and the CIA thought that Viaux was the only available
option. Kissinger ended the Viaux operation while urging that pressure
be kept on Allende "until such time as new marching orders are given."
[83] What Kissinger wanted was Viaux stopped for the time being
without an end to all domestic plotting, which might pay off in the long
run. Essentially, he did not want to discourage any anti-Allende faction,
but sought to distance Washington from the most extreme elements.
Perhaps Kissinger need not have worried about issues of control. As the
Chilean situation underscored, foreign army officers are not light
switches that can simply be "turned off." The CIA had spread the
message that it was interested in a coup against Allende and "by
now . . . all interested military parties know our position." [84] Whether
the US position made a tremendous difference is a matter of dispute,
and depends on how one views the autonomy of the Chilean officers
who, even once American support for a coup apparently was toned
down, continued to plot. This was clear from the moment that the CIA
tried to "switch off" the plotters: "Station false-flag officer met with
[Chilean] on [del] October and attempted to dissuade Viaux group from
undertaking a coup. The group, however, had met on 16 October and
decided to attempt a coup on 21 or 22 October." This was not restricted
to Viaux's group; reporting indicated that everywhere "Coup plotting
continues to flourish." [85]
A cable from Santiago bears out US efforts to increase the distance
between local officers and the plotters, saying that there was no one
from the station sharing "in planning of professionally executed
military coup, let alone to second guess ringleaders." Indeed it was

"pointedly stated" that the onus for action belonged to the Chilean
military from that time forward. On a wry note, the cable offers the
observation that "this whole operation [was] so unprofessional and
insecure that, in [the] Chilean setting, it could stand a chance of
succeeding." All that was required of the station was to assure the
plotters that they would not be left "high and dry" if their coup
succeeded. "This we have done." [86] Kissinger, nonetheless, was most
likely happy to hear that the opposition's plotting against Allende was
going ahead, even if the reports he heard offered little chance of
success.
Many have doubted the subsequent Hill testimony of Henry Kissinger
and his NSC deputy, Gen. Alexander Haig, who said that they knew
nothing of the plots against Schneider. [87] Throughout the crucial
weeks in October 1970, information continued to flow to Broe and
Karamessines at CIA Head-quarters, and both of these men testified
that they met with Kissinger during this period. Attesting to
connections at the most senior levels, a cable from his office to
Santiago on 18 October demands details of coup plotting because
"high-level policy decisions in USG may become necessary . . . ." [88]
On 19 October, a message from CIA Headquarters informs Santiago
that "[we] feel we must be prepared advise higher echelons of nature of
new military leaders and their programs in event coup attempted or
even succeeds." [89] Karemessines stated in the same Congressional
investigation that he had kept the White House abreast of all
developments. His statements appear plausible in light of currently
available documentation.
The bottom line, in my view, is that Kissinger and the White House
were aware of the coup plotting and were happy to see it go ahead, but
at the same time had no control over events. In light of the CIA's
surprise over the death of Gen. Schneider, the White House neither
planned nor desired the assassination. Moreover, US officials may have
failed to realize the level of complicity between all the various factions
involved in plotting. Ultimately, it may have been impossible to
separate the plotting of one group from the next.

When did Track II officially end? There are no memoranda or cables
under the title "Track II" after the inauguration of Allende on 3
November 1970. The last mention of Track II in the CIA's documents
is a report of the CIA's summary of Track II activity being delivered to
the Attorney General on 2 December 1970. [90] An enigmatic cable
dated 26 May 1971, may hold the key.