CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970

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CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970
Reexamining the Record
Kristian C. Gustafson
From Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2003 - Unclassified Edition
http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol47no3/
Editor's Note: Mr. Gustafson received the Studies in Intelligence Walter L. Pforzheimer Award for this article in 2002. The prize is given to the graduate or undergraduate student who submitted the best paper on an intelligence-related subject during the preceding year.
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From 1970 to 1973, the United States government was involved in overt and covert actions against the elected government of Chile led by Marxist Salvador Allende. Unfolding events during these politically tumultuous years included the death of Chilean Minister of Defense Ren? Schneider in October 1970. Ultimately, Allende was overthrown and replaced by Gen. Augusto Pinochet. The initial history of this period, recorded in the 1970s and early 1980s, told of a US government that abused its power and betrayed its principles. Public reaction was universally negative. This interpretation of events has affected the conduct and perception of American intelligence activities ever since. [1]
A generation has now passed and it is time to reexamine this "accepted" version of events. Recently, the US government posted thousands of declassified documents to its on-line "Chile Collection." [2] These newly available resources allow a more candid--and realistic--look into the actions and thoughts of the CIA agents and officers involved in those controversial operations. This study focuses on CIA covert action during the six weeks following Allende's victory at the polls in mid-September 1970. While the activities of the CIA may not always be excused, they can at least be better understood.
Genesis
So sure were senior US officials that Salvador Allende and his coalition would be defeated in the September 1970 election, as he had been three times previously, that, despite CIA warnings, they were caught off-guard when he won a plurality. Undeterred by the voters' preference, President Richard Nixon delivered a clear and forceful Directive calling for expanded CIA operations in Chile. In the weeks between Allende's election and his inauguration planned for 3 November, the CIA actively sought to foment a coup in Chile. Washington was unequivocal about its desire to keep Allende from power.
American actions against the Allende government occurred in what Nixon's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, called the "Autumn of Crises." [3] The Soviet Union was actively threatening American national security in several different arenas. Soviet missiles and technicians had been moved into Egypt. The rest of the Middle East was in chaos--Israeli attacks against its Arab neighbors were increasing daily, and Syria had attacked its supposed ally, Jordan. At the beginning of September, a large Soviet flotilla had arrived in Cienfuegos, Cuba: There was suspicion that the Soviets had designs on this harbor as a new submarine base in the Western Hemisphere. At a more global level, Washington was struggling to maintain momentum in the negotiations for the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.
It was in this framework of global power plays between the Soviet Union and the United States that the White House had to deal with the election of a Marxist-oriented government in Chile. On 15 September 1970, President Nixon called Kissinger, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell into the Oval Office to provide executive guidance for US policy toward Chile and Allende. William Colby--then Deputy Director, later Director, of the CIA--noted that "Nixon was furious" and was convinced that an Allende presidency would ensure the spread of Cuban President Fidel Castro's communist revolution to Chile and the rest of Latin America. [4] He wanted to prevent Allende from being inaugurated. The message he delivered at the meeting reflected his anger. The handwritten minutes taken by DCI Helms are revealing:
One in 10 chance, perhaps, but save Chile: Worth Spending Not concerned risks involved No involvement of Embassy $10,000,000 available, more if necessary full-time job--best men we have game plan make the economy scream 48 hours plan of action. [5]
Helms, understanding the import of the President's statements, commented: "If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day." [6] The Administration moved quickly to implement the Presidential Directive. Kissinger was to oversee the project, which was to be called "Track II" to differentiate it from the ongoing diplomatic and related efforts to thwart communist influence in Chile, known as "Track I."
When Allende's candidacy was announced in early 1970, the State Department had developed a policy to try to dampen Marxist electoral prospects. This approach--Track I--primarily involved efforts by the US Ambassador and his diplomatic staff to hinder Allende through the manipulation of Chilean congressmen and senators within the framework of the Chilean constitution. At the time, the State Department made a conscious decision to exclude the CIA from the planning and execution of the policy, because it believed that the CIA's warnings of