CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 9

Did Kissinger intend Track II to end, as he has testified? Probably, but that was at a time when the White House, 40 Committee, Track II staff, and the CIA thought that Viaux was the only available option. Kissinger ended the Viaux operation while urging that pressure be kept on Allende "until such time as new marching orders are given." [83] What Kissinger wanted was Viaux stopped for the time being without an end to all domestic plotting, which might pay off in the long run. Essentially, he did not want to discourage any anti-Allende faction, but sought to distance Washington from the most extreme elements.
Perhaps Kissinger need not have worried about issues of control. As the Chilean situation underscored, foreign army officers are not light switches that can simply be "turned off." The CIA had spread the message that it was interested in a coup against Allende and "by now . . . all interested military parties know our position." [84] Whether the US position made a tremendous difference is a matter of dispute, and depends on how one views the autonomy of the Chilean officers who, even once American support for a coup apparently was toned down, continued to plot. This was clear from the moment that the CIA tried to "switch off" the plotters: "Station false-flag officer met with [Chilean] on [del] October and attempted to dissuade Viaux group from undertaking a coup. The group, however, had met on 16 October and decided to attempt a coup on 21 or 22 October." This was not restricted to Viaux's group; reporting indicated that everywhere "Coup plotting continues to flourish." [85]
A cable from Santiago bears out US efforts to increase the distance between local officers and the plotters, saying that there was no one from the station sharing "in planning of professionally executed military coup, let alone to second guess ringleaders." Indeed it was "pointedly stated" that the onus for action belonged to the Chilean military from that time forward. On a wry note, the cable offers the observation that "this whole operation [was] so unprofessional and insecure that, in [the] Chilean setting, it could stand a chance of succeeding." All that was required of the station was to assure the plotters that they would not be left "high and dry" if their coup succeeded. "This we have done." [86] Kissinger, nonetheless, was most likely happy to hear that the opposition's plotting against Allende was going ahead, even if the reports he heard offered little chance of success.
Many have doubted the subsequent Hill testimony of Henry Kissinger and his NSC deputy, Gen. Alexander Haig, who said that they knew nothing of the plots against Schneider. [87] Throughout the crucial weeks in October 1970, information continued to flow to Broe and Karamessines at CIA Head-quarters, and both of these men testified that they met with Kissinger during this period. Attesting to connections at the most senior levels, a cable from his office to Santiago on 18 October demands details of coup plotting because "high-level policy decisions in USG may become necessary . . . ." [88] On 19 October, a message from CIA Headquarters informs Santiago that "[we] feel we must be prepared advise higher echelons of nature of new military leaders and their programs in event coup attempted or even succeeds." [89] Karemessines stated in the same Congressional investigation that he had kept the White House abreast of all developments. His statements appear plausible in light of currently available documentation.
The bottom line, in my view, is that Kissinger and the White House were aware of the coup plotting and were happy to see it go ahead, but at the same time had no control over events. In light of the CIA's surprise over the death of Gen. Schneider, the White House neither planned nor desired the assassination. Moreover, US officials may have failed to realize the level of complicity between all the various factions involved in plotting. Ultimately, it may have been impossible to separate the plotting of one group from the next.
When did Track II officially end? There are no memoranda or cables under the title "Track II" after the inauguration of Allende on 3 November 1970. The last mention of Track II in the CIA's documents is a report of the CIA's summary of Track II activity being delivered to the Attorney General on 2 December 1970. [90] An enigmatic cable dated 26 May 1971, may hold the key. This one line message reads: "Project [deleted] termination approved effective 30 June 1971." [91] Could the deleted word be "Fubelt"? Regardless, Track II, which aimed at precipitating a military takeover to prevent Allende's inauguration, effectively ended when that aim failed eight months earlier.
Despite the formal demise of Track II, American efforts to remove Allende continued throughout his administration.