Bolshevism | Page 9

revolution needs no
demonstration. Economic interest, tradition, and environment all
conspired to keep these popular bodies conservative. Landowners were
always in the majority and in general the zemstvos reflected the ideas
and ideals of the enlightened wealthy and cultivated classes. The
peasant representatives in the zemstvos were generally peasants of the
most successful and prosperous type, hating the revolutionists and all
their works. By means of a policy incredibly insane these
conservatively inclined elements of the population were goaded to
revolt. The newspapers and magazines of the zemstvos became more

and more critical of the government, more and more outspoken in
denunciation of existing conditions. Presently, the leaders of the
zemstvos followed the example of the revolutionists and held a secret
convention at which a program for common action was agreed upon.
Thus they were resorting to illegal methods, exactly as the Socialists
had done. Finally, many of the liberal zemstvo leaders formed
themselves into a political party--the Union of Liberation--with a
special organ of its own, called Emancipation. This organ, edited by the
brilliant and courageous Peter Struve, was published in Stuttgart,
Germany, and, since its circulation in Russia was forbidden, it had to
be smuggled into the country and secretly circulated, just as the
revolutionary Socialist journals were. Thus another bond was
established between two very different movements.
As was inevitable, revolutionary terrorism enormously increased. In the
cities the working-men were drawn mainly into the Social Democratic
Working-men's party, founded by Plechanov and others in 1898, but
the peasants, in so far as they were aroused at all, rallied around the
standard of the Socialist-Revolutionists, successors to the Will of the
People party. This party was peculiarly a party of the peasants, just as
the party of Plechanov was peculiarly a party of industrial workers. It
emphasized the land question above all else. It naturally scorned the
view, largely held by the Marxists in the other party, that Russia must
wait until her industrial development was perfected before attempting
to realize Socialism. It scorned the slow, legalistic methods and
resolutely answered the terrorism of Czarism by a terrorism of the
people. It maintained a special department for carrying on this grim
work. Its Central Committee passed sentences of death upon certain
officials, and its decrees were carried out by the members of its
Fighting Organization. To this organization within the party belonged
many of the ablest and most consecrated men and women in Russia.
A few illustrations will suffice to make clear the nature of this
terroristic retaliation: In March, 1902, Sypiagin, the Minister of the
Interior, was shot down as he entered his office by a member of the
Fighting Organization, Stephen Balmashev, who was disguised as an
officer. Sypiagin had been duly sentenced to death by the Central

Committee. He had been responsible for upward of sixty thousand
political arrests and for the suffering of many exiles. Balmashev went
to his death with heroic fortitude. In May, 1903, Gregory Gershuni and
two associates executed the reactionary Governor of Ufa. Early in June,
1904, Borikov, Governor-General of Finland, was assassinated by a
revolutionist. A month later, July 15th, the infamous Von Plehve, who
had been judged by the Central Committee and held responsible for the
Kishinev pogrom, was killed by a bomb thrown under the wheels of his
carriage by Sazanov, a member of the Fighting Force. The death of this
cruel tyrant thrilled the world. In February, 1905, Ivan Kaliaiev
executed the death sentence which had been passed upon the ruthless
Governor-General of Moscow, the Grand-Duke Serghei
Alexandrovich.
There was war in Russia--war between two systems of organized
terrorism. Sometimes the Czar and his Ministers weakened and
promised concessions, but always there was speedy reaction and,
usually, an increased vigor of oppression. The assassination of Von
Plehve, however, for the first time really weakened the government.
Czarism was, in fact, already toppling. The new Minister of the Interior,
Von Plehve's successor, Prince Svyatpolk-Mirski, sought to meet the
situation by a policy of compromise. While he maintained Von Plehve's
methods of suppressing the radical organizations and their press, and
using provocative agents to entrap revolutionary leaders, he granted a
certain degree of freedom to the moderate press and adopted a
relatively liberal attitude toward the zemstvos. By this means he hoped
to avert the impending revolution.
Taking advantage of the new conditions, the leaders of the zemstvos
organized a national convention. This the government forbade, but it
had lost much of its power and the leaders of the movement ignored the
order and proceeded to hold the convention. At this convention, held at
St. Petersburg, November 6, 1904, attended by many of the ablest
lawyers, doctors, professors, scientists, and publicists in Russia, a
resolution was adopted demanding that the government at once call
representatives of the people together for