Beyond Good and Evil | Page 6

Having kept a sharp eye on philosophers, and having read between their lines long
enough, I now say to myself that the greater part of conscious thinking must be counted
among the instinctive functions, and it is so even in the case of philosophical thinking;
one has here to learn anew, as one learned anew about heredity and "innateness." As little
as the act of birth comes into consideration in the whole process and procedure of
heredity, just as little is "being-conscious" OPPOSED to the instinctive in any decisive
sense; the greater part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly influenced by
his instincts, and forced into definite channels. And behind all logic and its seeming
sovereignty of movement, there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological
demands, for the maintenance of a definite mode of life For example, that the certain is
worth more than the uncertain, that illusion is less valuable than "truth" such valuations,
in spite of their regulative importance for US, might notwithstanding be only superficial
valuations, special kinds of maiserie, such as may be necessary for the maintenance of
beings such as ourselves. Supposing, in effect, that man is not just the "measure of
things."
4. The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it: it is here, perhaps, that our
new language sounds most strangely. The question is, how far an opinion is
life-furthering, life- preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing, and we are
fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic
judgments a priori belong), are the most indispensable to us, that without a recognition of
logical fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely IMAGINED world of the
absolute and immutable, without a constant counterfeiting of the world by means of
numbers, man could not live--that the renunciation of false opinions would be a
renunciation of life, a negation of life. TO RECOGNISE UNTRUTH AS A CONDITION
OF LIFE; that is certainly to impugn the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner,
and a philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself beyond good
and evil.
5. That which causes philosophers to be regarded half- distrustfully and half-mockingly,
is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are--how often and easily they make
mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike they are,--but that there
is not enough honest dealing with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry
when the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. They all pose
as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving
of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who,
fairer and foolisher, talk of "inspiration"), whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea,
or "suggestion," which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended
by them with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates who do not
wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices, which

they dub "truths,"-- and VERY far from having the conscience which bravely admits this
to itself, very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this
be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule.
The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with which he
entices us into the dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his "categorical
imperative"-- makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in spying
out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical preachers. Or, still more so, the
hocus-pocus in mathematical form, by means of which Spinoza has, as it were, clad his
philosophy in mail and mask--in fact, the "love of HIS wisdom," to translate the term
fairly and squarely--in order thereby to strike terror at once into the heart of the assailant
who should dare to cast a glance on that invincible maiden, that Pallas Athene:--how
much of personal timidity and vulnerability does this masquerade of a sickly recluse
betray!
6. It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has
consisted of--namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and
unconscious auto-biography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in every
philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always
grown. Indeed, to understand how the abstrusest metaphysical assertions of a philosopher
have been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask oneself: "What morality do
they (or does he) aim at?" Accordingly, I do not believe that an "impulse to knowledge"
is the father of philosophy;