Bergson and His Philosophy | Page 4

etcher's art or of the process of the
mint that we can fully represent Bergson's resources of style. These

suggest staccato effects, hard outlines, and that does not at all represent
the prose of this writer. It is a fine, delicately interwoven, tissue-like
fabric, pliant and supple. If one were in the secret of M. Bergson's
private thoughts, it might be discovered that he does not admire his
style so much as others do, for his whole manner of thought must, one
suspects, have led him often to attempt to express the inexpressible.
The ocean of life, that fluide bienfaisant in which we are immersed, has
no doubt often proved too fluid even for him. "Only the understanding
has a language," he almost ruefully declares in L'Evolution creatrice;
and the understanding is, for him, compared with intuition peu de chose.
Yet we can say that in what he has achieved his success is remarkable.
The web of language which he weaves seems to fit and follow the
movements of his thought as the skin ripples over the moving muscles
of the thoroughbred. And this is not an accidental or trivial fact. M.
Bergson may possibly agree with Seneca that "too much attention to
style does not become a philosopher," but the quality of his thought and
temperament does not allow him to express himself otherwise than
lucidly. Take this, almost at random, as a characteristic example. It
must be given, of course, in the original:
L'intelligence humaine, telle que nous la representons, n'est point du
tout celle que nous montrait Platon dans l'allegorie de la caverne. Elle
n'a pas plus pour fonction de regarder passer des ombres vaines que de
contempler, en se retournant derriere elle, l'astre eblouissant. Elle a
autre chose a faire. Atteles comme des boeufs de labour, a une lourde
tache, nous sentons le jeu de nos muscles et de nos articulations, le
poids de la charrue et la resistance du sol: agir et se savoir agir, entrer
en contact avec la realite et meme la vivre, mais dans la measure
seulement ou elle interesse l'oeuvre qui s'accomplit et le sillon qui se
creuse, voila la fonction de l'intelligence humaine."
That is sufficiently clear; we may legitimately doubt whether it is an
adequate account of the function of the human intelligence, but we
cannot be in any doubt as to what the view is; and more than that, once
we have become acquainted with it, we are not likely to forget it.
For the student as yet unpractised in philosophical reflection, Bergson's
skill and clarity of statement, his fertility in illustration, his frequent
and picturesque use of analogy may be a pitfall. It all sounds so
convincing and right, as Bergson puts it, that the critical faculty is put

to sleep. There is peril in this, particularly here, where we have to deal
with so bold and even revolutionary a doctrine. If we are able to retain
our independence of judgment we are bound sooner or later, in spite of
Bergson's persuasiveness, to have our misgivings. After all, we may
begin to reflect, he has been too successful, he has proved too much. In
attempting to use, as he was bound to do, the intelligence to discredit
the intelligence he has been attempting the impossible. He has only
succeeded in demonstrating the authority, the magisterial power, of the
intelligence. No step in Philosophy can be taken without it. What are
Life, Consciousness, Evolution, even Movement, as these terms are
employed by Bergson, but the symbolization of concepts which on his
own showing are the peculiar products of the human understanding or
intelligence? It seems, indeed, on reflection, the oddest thing that
Philosophy should be employed in the service of an anti-intellectual, or
as it would be truer to call it a supra- intellectual, attitude. Philosophy
is a thinking view of things. It represents the most persistent effort of
the human intelligence to satisfy its own needs, to attempt to solve the
problems which it has created: in the familiar phrase, to heal the
wounds which it has itself made. The intellect, therefore, telling itself
that it is incompetent for this purpose, is a strange, and not truly
impressive, spectacle.
We are not enabled to recover from the sense of impotency thus created
by being referred to "intuition." Bergson is not the first to try this way
out. It would be misleading, no doubt, to identify him with the
members of the Scottish School of a hundred years ago or with Jacobi;
he reaches his conclusion in another way, and that conclusion is
differently framed; nevertheless, in essence there is a similarity, and
Hegel's comments[Footnote: Smaller Logic, Wallace's translation, c. v.]
on Bergson's forerunners will often be found to have point with
reference to Bergson himself.
It is hardly conceivable