Before the War | Page 5

of Fallodon took the
only course that was practicable, and that, had the danger of the
catastrophe to be faced again and for the first time, the course he took
would, even in the light of all we know to-day, again afford the best

chance of avoiding it. He succeeded in improving greatly for the time
the relations between this country and Germany, and but for the
outbreak in the Near East he would probably have succeeded in
navigating the dangerous waters successfully. The chance was far from
being a hopeless one, and subsequent study of the facts has
strengthened my impression that down to at least about the middle of
the year 1913 the chances were substantially in his favor. A sufficiency
at least of the leaders in other countries were co-operating with him, not
all the leaders, but those who were in reality most important. The war
when it came was due, not only to the failure of certain of the
prominent men in the capitals of the Central Powers to adhere to
principles to which for a long time they had held fast, but to the
accident of untoward circumstances and the contingency that is
inseparable from human affairs.
Such are some of the reasons which have led me to say what I have
tried to express in the pages which follow. I have never been able to
bring myself to believe that there are vast differences between the ways
of thinking and habits of mind of the great and most highly civilized
peoples of Europe. I have seen something of the Germans, and what I
have learned of them and of their history has led me to the conclusion
that, certain traditions of theirs notwithstanding, they resemble us more
than they differ from us. If this be so, the sooner we take advantage of
our present victory by seeking to turn our eyes from the past as far as
can be, and to look steadily toward a future in which the misery and sin
which that past saw shall be dwelt on to the least extent that is
practicable, the better it will be for ourselves as well as for the rest of
the world.
That world has been reminded of a great truth which had been partly
forgotten by those whose faith lay in militarism. It is that to set up
might as the foundation of right may in the end be to inspire those
around with a passionate desire to hold such might in check and to
overcome it. Democracy is not a system that lends itself easily to
scientific preparation for war, but when democratic nations are really
aroused their staying power, just because it rests on a true General Will,
is without rival. The latent force in humanity which has its foundation

in ethical idealism is the greatest of all forces for the vindication of
right. German militarism managed to fail to understand this. Let us take
pains to show our late enemies that if they make it clear that they have
extinguished such militarism in a lasting fashion, the quarrel with them
is at an end.
I am far from thinking that we here are perfect in our habits as a nation.
We are apt not to keep in view how what we do is likely to look to
others. We are somewhat deficient in the faculty of self-examination
and self-criticism. Want of clarity of ground-principle in higher ideals
is apt to prove a hindrance to more than the individual only. It generally
brings with it want of clarity in the sense of social obligation. And this
sometimes extends even to our relations to other countries.
It leads to our being misinterpreted as a nation. We have suffered a
good deal in the past from having attributed to us motives which were
not ours. The reason was the assumption that the apparent absence of
definiteness in national purpose must have been designed as a cover for
hidden and selfish ends. It is not true. We are indeed very insular, and
what has been called the international mind is not common among the
people of these islands. But we are kindly at heart, and when we have
seemed self-regarding it has been simply because we were not
conscious of our own limitations and had not much appreciation of the
modes of thought of other people. We have paid the penalty for this
defect at periods in our history. At one time France suspected us, I
think in the main unjustly. Later on Germany suspected us, I think of a
certainty unjustly. Now these things arise in part at least from our
reputation for a particular kind of disposition, our supposed habitual
and deliberately adopted desire to wait until the particular international
situation of the