Before the War | Page 3

even a chance of a great
European war in which we might be involved, we did not appreciate the
magnitude of what was at stake, and, laying everything else aside,
concentrate our efforts on the immediate fashioning of such vast
military forces as we possessed toward the end of the war? The answer
will be found in the fourth chapter. We were aware of the risk, and we
took what we thought the best means to meet it. Had we tried to do
what we are reproached for not having done, we must have become
weaker before we could have become stronger. For this statement I
have given the military reasons. In a time of peace, even if the country
had assented to the attempt being made, it is certain that we could not
have accomplished such a purpose without long delay. It is probable
that the result would have been failure, and it is almost certain that we
should have provoked a "preventive war" on the part of Germany, a
war not only with a very fair prospect, as things then stood, of a
German success, but with something else that would have looked like
the justification of a German effort to prevent that country from being
encircled. Such a war would, with equal likelihood, have been the
outcome even of the proclamation at such a time of a military alliance
between the Entente Powers.
Other critics, belonging to a wholly different school of political thought,
ask why we moved at all, and why we did not adhere to the good old
policy of holding aloof from interference in Continental affairs. The
answer is simple. The days when "splendid isolation" was possible
were gone. Our sea power, even as an instrument of self-defense, was
in danger of becoming inadequate in the absence of friendships which
should insure that other navies would remain neutral if they did not
actively co-operate with ours. It was only through the medium of such
friendships that ultimate naval preponderance could be secured. The
consciousness of that fact pervaded the Entente. With those responsible
for the conduct of tremendous affairs probability has to be the guide of
life. The question is always not what ought to happen but what is most
likely to happen.

On the details of the diplomatic aspect of our endeavor, and on the
spirit in which it was sought to carry it out, the second and third
chapters of the book may serve to throw some light. The fourth chapter
relates to the strategical plan, worked out after much consideration, for
the possible event of failure. The plan was throughout based on the
maintenance of superior sea power as the paramount instrument. As is
indicated, the conservation of sufficient sea power implied as essential
close and friendly relations with France, and also with Russia. Had
there been no initial reason for the Entente policy, to be found in the
desire to get rid of all causes of friction with these two great nations,
the preservation of the prospect of continuing able to command the sea
in war would in itself have necessitated the Entente. This conclusion
was the result of the stocktaking of their assets for self-defense which
the Entente Powers had to make when confronted with the growing
organization for war of the Central Powers.
To set up the balancing of Powers as a principle was what we in this
country would have been glad to have avoided had it been practicable
to do so. We should have preferred the freedom of our old position of
"splendid isolation." But the growing preparations of the Central
Powers compelled Great Britain, France, and Russia to think of safety
for each of them severally as to be secured only by treating such safety
as a common interest. In the face of a new and growing danger we
dared not leave ourselves to the risk of being dealt with in detail. The
first thing to be done was, if possible, to convince the Central Powers
that it would be to their own advantage to come to a complete
agreement with us, an agreement of a business character, analogous to
that which Lord Lansdowne had so satisfactorily concluded with
France, and accompanied by cessation of the reasons which had led
them to pile up armaments. There were highly influential persons in
Germany who were far from averse to the suggested business
arrangement. The armament question presented greater difficulty in that
country, largely because of its tradition. But its solution was vital, for
there were also those in Germany whose aim was to dispute with Great
Britain the possession of the trident. Now for us, who constituted the
island center of a scattered Empire, and who depended for food and raw
materials on freedom to sail our