Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates | Page 9

one who believes that there are things relating
to demons, but does not believe that there are demons?
Mel. There is not.
Socr. How obliging you are in having hardly answered; though
compelled by these judges! You assert, then, that I do believe and teach
things relating to demons, whether they be new or old; therefore,
according to your admission, I do believe in things relating to demons,
and this you have sworn in the bill of indictment. If, then, I believe in
things relating to demons, there is surely an absolute necessity that I
should believe that there are demons. Is it not so? It is. For I suppose

you to assent, since you do not answer. But with respect to demons, do
we not allow that they are gods, or the children of gods? Do you admit
this or not?
Mel. Certainly.
Socr. Since, then, I allow that there are demons, as you admit, if
demons are a kind of gods, this is the point in which I say you speak
enigmatically and divert yourself in saying that I do not allow there are
gods, and again that I do allow there are, since I allow that there are
demons? But if demons are the children of gods, spurious ones, either
from nymphs or any others, of whom they are reported to be, what man
can think that there are sons of gods, and yet that there are not gods?
For it would be just as absurd as if any one should think that there are
mules, the offspring of horses and asses, but should not think there are
horses and asses. However, Melitus, it can not be otherwise than that
you have preferred this indictment for the purpose of trying me, or
because you were at a loss what real crime to allege against me; for that
you should persuade any man who has the smallest degree of sense that
the same person can think that there are things relating to demons and
to gods, and yet that there are neither demons, nor gods, not heroes, is
utterly impossible.
16. That I am not guilty, then, O Athenians! according to the
indictment of Melitus, appears to me not to require a lengthened
defense; but what I have said is sufficient. And as to what I said at the
beginning, that there is a great enmity toward me among the multitude,
be assured it is true. And this it is which will condemn me, if I am
condemned, not Melitus, nor Anytus, but the calumny and envy of the
multitude, which have already condemned many others, and those good
men, and will, I think, condemn others also; for there is no danger that
it will stop with me.
Perhaps, however, some one may say, "Are you not ashamed, Socrates,
to have pursued a study from which you are now in danger of dying?"
To such a person I should answer with good reason, You do not say
well, friend, if you think that a man, who is even of the least value,
ought to take into the account the risk of life or death, and ought not to

consider that alone when be performs any action, whether he is acting
justly or unjustly, and the part of a good man or bad man. For,
according to your reasoning, all those demi-gods that died at Troy
would be vile characters, as well all the rest as the son of Thetis, who
so far despised danger in comparison of submitting to disgrace, that
when his mother, who was a goddess, spoke to him, in his impatience
to kill Hector, something to this effect, as I think,[2] "My son, if you
revenge the death of your friend Patroclus, and slay Hector, you will
yourself die, for," she said, "death awaits you immediately after
Hector;" but he, on hearing this, despised death and danger, and
dreading much more to live as a coward, and not avenge his friend, said,
"May I die immediately when I have inflicted punishment on the guilty,
that I may not stay here an object of ridicule, by the curved ships, a
burden to the ground?"--do you think that he cared for death and danger?
For thus it is, O Athenians! in truth: wherever any one has posted
himself, either thinking it to be better, or has been posted by his chief,
there, as it appears to me, he ought to remain and meet danger, taking
no account either of death or anything else in comparison with
disgrace.
17. I then should be acting strangely, O Athenians! if, when the
generals whom you chose to command me assigned me my post at
Potidæa, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I then remained where they
posted me, like any other person, and