An Introduction to Philosophy | Page 8

the world's history for him or for
any man to cope with such a task. In the days of Plato a man might
have hoped to accomplish it.
6. WHAT PHILOSOPHY MEANS IN OUR TIME.--It savors of
temerity to write down such a title as that which heads the present
section. There are men living to-day to whom philosophy means little
else than the doctrine of Kant, or of Hegel, or of the brothers Caird, or
of Herbert Spencer, or even of St. Thomas Aquinas, for we must not
forget that many of the seminaries of learning in Europe and some in
America still hold to the mediaeval church philosophy.
But let me gather up in a few words the purport of what has been said
above. Philosophy once meant the whole body of scientific knowledge.
Afterward it came to mean the whole body of knowledge which could
be attained by the mere light of human reason, unaided by revelation.
The several special sciences sprang up, and a multitude of men have for
a long time past devoted themselves to definite limited fields of
investigation with little attention to what has been done in other fields.
Nevertheless, there has persisted the notion of a discipline which
somehow concerns itself with the whole system of things, rather than
with any limited division of that broad field. It is a notion not peculiar
to the disciples of Spencer. There are many to whom philosophy is a
"Weltweisheit," a world-wisdom. Shall we say that this is the meaning
of the word philosophy now? And if we do, how shall we draw a line
between philosophy and the body of the special sciences?
Perhaps the most just way to get a preliminary idea of what philosophy
means to the men of our time is to turn away for the time being from

the definition of any one man or group of men, and to ask ourselves
what a professor of philosophy in an American or European university
is actually supposed to teach.
It is quite clear that he is not supposed to be an Aristotle. He does not
represent all the sciences, and no one expects him to lecture on
mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry, zoölogy, botany,
economics, politics, and various other disciplines. There was a time
when he might have been expected to teach all that men could know,
but that time is long past.
Nevertheless, there is quite a group of sciences which are regarded as
belonging especially to his province; and although a man may devote a
large part of his attention to some one portion of the field, he would
certainly be thought remiss if he wholly neglected the rest. This group
of sciences includes logic, psychology, ethics and aesthetics,
metaphysics, and the history of philosophy. I have not included
epistemology or the "theory of knowledge" as a separate discipline, for
reasons which will appear later (Chapter XIX); and I have included the
history of philosophy, because, whether we care to call this a special
science or not, it constitutes a very important part of the work of the
teacher of philosophy in our day.
Of this group of subjects the student who goes to the university to study
philosophy is supposed to know something before he leaves its walls,
whatever else he may or may not know.
It should be remarked, again, that there is commonly supposed to be a
peculiarly close relation between philosophy and religion. Certainly, if
any one about a university undertakes to give a course of lectures on
theism, it is much more apt to be the professor of philosophy than the
professor of mathematics or of chemistry. The man who has written an
"Introduction to Philosophy," a "Psychology," a "Logic," and an
"Outlines of Metaphysics" is very apt to regard it as his duty to add to
the list a "Philosophy of Religion." The students in the theological
seminaries of Europe and America are usually encouraged, if not
compelled, to attend courses in philosophy.

Finally, it appears to be definitely accepted that even the disciplines
that we never think of classing among the philosophical sciences are
not wholly cut off from a connection with philosophy. When we are
occupied, not with adding to the stock of knowledge embraced within
the sphere of any special science, but with an examination of the
methods of the science, with, so to speak, a criticism of the foundations
upon which the science rests, our work is generally recognized as
philosophical. It strikes no one as odd in our day that there should be
established a "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific
Methods," but we should think it strange if some one announced the
intention to publish a "Journal of Philosophy and Comparative
Anatomy." It is not without its significance that, when