An Ethical Problem | Page 7

greatly to be deplored. Is there, then, no method of prevention? Are we
simply to fold our hands and trust that the humaner instincts of the
present-day vivisector, working in the seclusion of his private
laboratory, will keep him free from all that we regret in the vivisection
of the past? Or must we, on the other hand, ask for the total
condemnation of every experiment, because some are cruel and
atrocious?
This is the platform of the Restrictionist. It cannot--except by
perversion of truth--be regarded as antivivisection, for there is not a
single society in England or America, devoted to the interests of that
cause, which would acknowledge these views as in any way
representative of its ideals; but it is the expression of sentiments which
formerly were almost universally held by the medical profession of
England. Yet the advocates of unrestricted vivisection have never been
willing to consider this position, and, in controversy, invariable fall
back upon arguments applicable only to the views of those who would
abolish vivisection altogether.
There is yet another position to be taken; it is the attitude of unconcern.
From vast numbers nothing better can be expected. The man who is
utterly indifferent to the unnecessary agony accompanying the
slaughter of animals for food, or to the cruelties of sport, or the woman
whose vanity demands sacrifices of animals at the cost of incalculable
suffering, will take little or no interest in the question of vivisections;
nor is complicity with other phases of torment and cruelty alone
responsible for the indifference which so generally exists. In every age,
from the twilight of earliest savagery down to the present time, the vast
majority of human beings have been inclined, not to doubt, but to
believe, and especially to believe those who claimed superior
knowledge in matters of Life and Death. This tendency to
unquestioning faith has been the support of every phase of injustice, of
cruelty, and of wrong. It has led to innumerable men and women of
education and refinement to remit all questions of animal
experimentation to the vivisector and his friends, precisely as they
would have done had they lived three centuries ago, and had it been

theirs to decide on the morality of burning a witch. On the other hand,
the alliance between the laboratory and the medical profession, their
mutual endeavour to stifle criticism and to induce approval of all
vivisection whatever, has given rise to a new spirit of inquiry. A moral
question is never absolutely decided until it is decided aright. If the
problem of vivisection is ever settled, it will be due, not to the
influence of those who advocate unquestioning faith in the humaneness
of the average experimenter, who decline inquiry, and who rest
satisfied with their ignorance, but rather to those who, having
investigated the question for themselves, have given all their influence
for some measure of reform. In questions of humanity, even the
unwisdom of enthusiasm that tends toward reform is far better than
indifference and unconcern.
The ignorance of history, shown often by the advocates of unlimited
vivisection, is a singular phenomenon. The beginnings of this
controversy are not without interest. Let us glance at them.
CHAPTER II
ON CERTAIN MISTAKES OF SCIENTISTS
Every reflecting student of history is struck by the divergence of
opinions manifest among educated men in regard to the great problems
of life. Why is it that so few of us are able to state the facts and
arguments which favour conclusions to which we are utterly opposed?
Take, for instance, the great question of religious belief. Can one refer
to any Protestant writer of our time who has placed before his readers
the arguments which inclined men like Newman or Manning to the
Catholic faith? Has any Catholic writer of our time been able to present
fairly the arguments which seem so overwhelmingly convincing to
Protestant thinkers? In either case, is there not something of distortion
or exaggeration? Certainly it cannot be due to intentional and perverse
obliquity of mental vision. As a rule reasonable men endeavour to be
just and fair. Now and then, in the heat of controversy, a tendency to
overstatement or exaggeration may be evident, especially where great
issues appear to be involved; but the purpose can be reconciled with

honesty. Is it not more than probable that the principal reason for
divergent views on the part of honest opponents is IGNORANCE OF
FACTS?
Take, for example, the opinion held to-day by the great majority of
young physicians concerning animal experimentation. As a rule they
regard all criticism of vivisection with infinite contempt. During their
medical studies they were continually imbued with the idea that the
opposition to laboratory freedom of experimentation was an agitation
of comparatively recent date, and confined to a small class