An Essay towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit, Humour, Railery, Satire, and Ridicule | Page 5

crack the Stage, When Bajazet begins to
rage; Not a tall Metaphor in th' bombast Way, Nor the dry Chips of
short-lung'd Seneca. Nor upon all Things to obtrude, And force some
odd Similitude. What is it then, which like the _Pow'r Divine_, We only
can by Negatives define?
VIII.
In a true Piece of Wit, all Things must be, Yet all Things there _agree_;
As in the Ark, join 'd without Force or Strife, All Creatures dwelt; all
Creatures that had Life. Or as the primitive Forms of all, (If we
compare great Things with small) Which without Discord or Confusion
lie, In the strange Mirror of the Deity.
IX.
But Love, that moulds one Man up out of two, Makes me forget, and
injure you. I took You for Myself
, sure when I thought That You in any
thing were to be taught. Correct my Error with thy Pen, And if any ask
me then, What thing right Wit, and Height of Genius is, I'll only shew

your Lines, and say, _'Tis this_.
The Spirit and Wit of this Ode are excellent; and yet it is evident,
through the whole, that Mr. Cowley had no clear Idea of Wit, though at
the same time it shines in most of these Lines: There is little Merit in
saying what WIT is not, which is the chief Part of this Ode. Towards
the End, he indeed attempts to describe what it is, but is quite vague
and perplex'd in his Description; and at last, instead of collecting his
scatter'd Rays into a Focus, and exhibiting succinctly the clear Essence
and Power of WIT, he drops the whole with a trite Compliment.
The learned Dr. Barrow, in his Sermon against foolish Talking and
Jesting, gives the following profuse Description of WIT.
But first it may be demanded, What the Thing we speak of is? Or what
the Facetiousness (or Wit as he calls it before) doth import? To which
Questions I might reply, as Democritus did to him that asked the
Definition of a Man, _'Tis that we all see and know._ Any one better
apprehends what it is by Acquaintance, than I can inform him by
Description. It is indeed a Thing so versatile and multiform, appearing
in so many Shapes, so many Postures, so many Garbs, so variously
apprehended by several Eyes and Judgments, that it seemeth no less
hard to settle a clear and certain Notion thereof, than to make a Portrait
of Proteus, or to define the Figure of the fleeting Air. Sometimes it
lieth in pat Allusion to a known Story, or in seasonable Application of a
trivial Saying, or in forging an apposite Tale: Sometimes it playeth in
Words and Phrases, taking Advantage from the Ambiguity of their
Sense, or the Affinity of their Sound: Sometimes it is wrapp'd in a
Dress of humorous Expression: Sometimes it lurketh under an odd
Similitude: Sometimes it is lodged in a sly Question, in a smart Answer,
in a quirkish Reason, in a shrewd Intimation, in cunningly diverting, or
cleverly retorting an Objection: Sometimes it is couched in a bold
Scheme of Speech, in a tart Irony, in a lusty Hyperbole, in a startling
Metaphor, in a plausible Reconciling of Contradictions, or in acute
Nonsense; Sometimes a scenical Representation of Persons or Things, a
counterfeit Speech, a mimical Look or Gesture passeth for it.
Sometimes an affected Simplicity, sometimes a presumptuous

Bluntness giveth it Being. Sometimes it riseth from a lucky Hitting
upon what is Strange; sometimes from a crafty wresting obvious Matter
to the Purpose. Often it' consisteth in one knows not what, and
springeth up one can hardly tell how. Its ways are unaccountable, and
inexplicable, being answerable to the numberless Rovings of Fancy,
and Windings of Language. It is, in short, a Manner of Speaking out of
the simple and plain Way (such as Reason teacheth, and proveth Things
by) which by a pretty, surprizing Uncouthness in Conceit or Expression,
doth affect and amuse the Fancy, stirring in it some Wonder, and
breeding some Delight thereto. It raiseth Admiration, as signifying a
nimble Sagacity of Apprehension, a special Felicity of Invention, a
Vivacity of Spirit, and Reach of Wit, more than vulgar; it seeming to
argue a rare Quickness of Parts, that one can fetch in remote Conceits
applicable; a notable Skill that he can dextrously accommodate them to
the Purpose before him; together with a lively Briskness of Humour,
not apt to damp those Sportful Flashes of Imagination. (Whence in
Aristotle such Persons are termed "epidexioi", dexterous Men, and
"eutropoi", Men of facile or versatile Manners, who can easily turn
themselves to all Things, or turn all Things to themselves.) It also
procureth Delight, by gratifying Curiosity with its Rareness, or
Semblance of Difficulty. (As Monsters,