An Essay on the Principle of Population | Page 2

in
some measure be decisive of the future fate of mankind.
It has been said that the great question is now at issue, whether man
shall henceforth start forwards with accelerated velocity towards
illimitable, and hitherto unconceived improvement, or be condemned to
a perpetual oscillation between happiness and misery, and after every
effort remain still at an immeasurable distance from the wished-for
goal.
Yet, anxiously as every friend of mankind must look forwards to the
termination of this painful suspense, and eagerly as the inquiring mind
would hail every ray of light that might assist its view into futurity, it is
much to be lamented that the writers on each side of this momentous
question still keep far aloof from each other. Their mutual arguments
do not meet with a candid examination. The question is not brought to

rest on fewer points, and even in theory scarcely seems to be
approaching to a decision.
The advocate for the present order of things is apt to treat the sect of
speculative philosophers either as a set of artful and designing knaves
who preach up ardent benevolence and draw captivating pictures of a
happier state of society only the better to enable them to destroy the
present establishments and to forward their own deep-laid schemes of
ambition, or as wild and mad-headed enthusiasts whose silly
speculations and absurd paradoxes are not worthy the attention of any
reasonable man.
The advocate for the perfectibility of man, and of society, retorts on the
defender of establishments a more than equal contempt. He brands him
as the slave of the most miserable and narrow prejudices; or as the
defender of the abuses of civil society only because he profits by them.
He paints him either as a character who prostitutes his understanding to
his interest, or as one whose powers of mind are not of a size to grasp
any thing great and noble, who cannot see above five yards before him,
and who must therefore be utterly unable to take in the views of the
enlightened benefactor of mankind.
In this unamicable contest the cause of truth cannot but suffer. The
really good arguments on each side of the question are not allowed to
have their proper weight. Each pursues his own theory, little solicitous
to correct or improve it by an attention to what is advanced by his
opponents.
The friend of the present order of things condemns all political
speculations in the gross. He will not even condescend to examine the
grounds from which the perfectibility of society is inferred. Much less
will he give himself the trouble in a fair and candid manner to attempt
an exposition of their fallacy.
The speculative philosopher equally offends against the cause of truth.
With eyes fixed on a happier state of society, the blessings of which he
paints in the most captivating colours, he allows himself to indulge in
the most bitter invectives against every present establishment, without

applying his talents to consider the best and safest means of removing
abuses and without seeming to be aware of the tremendous obstacles
that threaten, even in theory, to oppose the progress of man towards
perfection.
It is an acknowledged truth in philosophy that a just theory will always
be confirmed by experiment. Yet so much friction, and so many minute
circumstances occur in practice, which it is next to impossible for the
most enlarged and penetrating mind to foresee, that on few subjects can
any theory be pronounced just, till all the arguments against it have
been maturely weighed and clearly and consistently refuted.
I have read some of the speculations on the perfectibility of man and of
society with great pleasure. I have been warmed and delighted with the
enchanting picture which they hold forth. I ardently wish for such
happy improvements. But I see great, and, to my understanding,
unconquerable difficulties in the way to them. These difficulties it is
my present purpose to state, declaring, at the same time, that so far
from exulting in them, as a cause of triumph over the friends of
innovation, nothing would give me greater pleasure than to see them
completely removed.
The most important argument that I shall adduce is certainly not new.
The principles on which it depends have been explained in part by
Hume, and more at large by Dr Adam Smith. It has been advanced and
applied to the present subject, though not with its proper weight, or in
the most forcible point of view, by Mr Wallace, and it may probably
have been stated by many writers that I have never met with. I should
certainly therefore not think of advancing it again, though I mean to
place it in a point of view in some degree different from any that I have