An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume I. | Page 9

before it, distinct from the sound it
uses as a sign of it. (2) That this idea, thus determined, i.e. which the
mind has in itself, and knows, and sees there, be determined without
any change to that name, and that name determined to that precise idea.
If men had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, they
would both discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went,
and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have
with others.
Besides this, the bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise
the reader that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one
of the Association of Ideas, the other of Enthusiasm. These, with some
other larger additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by
themselves, after the same manner, and for the same purpose, as was
done when this Essay had the second impression.
In the Sixth Edition there is very little added or altered. The greatest
part of what is new is contained in the twenty-first chapter of the
second book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a
very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition.

ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

INTRODUCTION.
1. An Inquiry into the Understanding pleasant and useful.
Since it is the UNDERSTANDING that sets man above the rest of
sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which
he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth
our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilst it
makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and
it requires and art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own
object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this
inquiry; whatever it be that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves;
sure I am that all the light we can let in upon our minds, all the
acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only
be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts
in the search of other things.
2. Design.
This, therefore, being my purpose--to inquire into the original, certainty,
and extent of HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, together with the grounds and
degrees of BELIEF, OPINION, and ASSENT;--I shall not at present
meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself
to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our
spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any SENSATION
by our organs, or any IDEAS in our understandings; and whether those
ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not.
These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall
decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It shall
suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a
man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do
with. And I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the
thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain
method, I can give any account of the ways whereby our

understandings come to attain those notions of things we have; and can
set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge; or the
grounds of those persuasions which are to be found amongst men, so
various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted
somewhere or other with such assurance and confidence, that he that
shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition,
and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith
they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are
maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no
such thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to
attain a certain knowledge of it.
3. Method.
It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between opinion
and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things whereof we
have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent and
moderate our persuasion. In order whereunto I shall pursue this
following method:-- First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas,
notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man
observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways
whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.
Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding
hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.
Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of
FAITH or OPINION: