An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals | Page 9

it seems undeniable, THAT nothing can bestow more merit on any
human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an eminent degree; and THAT a
PART, at least, of its merit arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species,
and bestow happiness on human society. We carry our view into the salutary
consequences of such a character and disposition; and whatever has so benign an
influence, and forwards so desirable an end, is beheld with complacency and pleasure.
The social virtues are never regarded without their beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as
barren and unfruitful. The happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of
families, the mutual support of friends, are always considered as the result of their gentle
dominion over the breasts of men.
How considerable a PART of their merit we ought to ascribe to their utility, will better
appear from future disquisitions; [Footnote: Sect. III. and IV.] as well as the reason, why
this circumstance has such a command over our esteem and approbation. [Footnote: Sect.

V.]

SECTION III.
OF JUSTICE.


PART I.

THAT Justice is useful to society, and consequently that PART of its merit, at least, must
arise from that consideration, it would be a superfluous undertaking to prove. That public
utility is the SOLE origin of justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequences
of this virtue are the SOLE foundation of its merit; this proposition, being more curious
and important, will better deserve our examination and enquiry.
Let us suppose that nature has bestowed on the human race such profuse ABUNDANCE
of all EXTERNAL conveniencies, that, without any uncertainty in the event, without any
care or industry on our part, every individual finds himself fully provided with whatever
his most voracious appetites can want, or luxurious imagination wish or desire. His
natural beauty, we shall suppose, surpasses all acquired ornaments: the perpetual
clemency of the seasons renders useless all clothes or covering: the raw herbage affords
him the most delicious fare; the clear fountain, the richest beverage. No laborious
occupation required: no tillage: no navigation. Music, poetry, and contemplation form his
sole business: conversation, mirth, and friendship his sole amusement. It seems evident
that, in such a happy state, every other social virtue would flourish, and receive tenfold
increase; but the cautious, jealous virtue of justice would never once have been dreamed
of. For what purpose make a partition of goods, where every one has already more than
enough? Why give rise to property, where there cannot possibly be any injury? Why call
this object MINE, when upon the seizing of it by another, I need but stretch out my hand
to possess myself to what is equally valuable? Justice, in that case, being totally useless,
would be an idle ceremonial, and could never possibly have place in the catalogue of
virtues.
We see, even in the present necessitous condition of mankind, that, wherever any benefit
is bestowed by nature in an unlimited abundance, we leave it always in common among
the whole human race, and make no subdivisions of right and property. Water and air,
though the most necessary of all objects, are not challenged as the property of individuals;
nor can any man commit injustice by the most lavish use and enjoyment of these
blessings. In fertile extensive countries, with few inhabitants, land is regarded on the
same footing. And no topic is so much insisted on by those, who defend the liberty of the
seas, as the unexhausted use of them in navigation. Were the advantages, procured by

navigation, as inexhaustible, these reasoners had never had any adversaries to refute; nor
had any claims ever been advanced of a separate, exclusive dominion over the ocean.
It may happen, in some countries, at some periods, that there be established a property in
water, none in land [Footnote: Genesis, cbaps. xiii. and xxi.]; if the latter be in greater
abundance than can be used by the inhabitants, and the former be found, with difficulty,
and in very small quantities.
Again; suppose, that, though the necessities of human race continue the same as at
present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship and generosity, that
every man has the utmost tenderness for every man, and feels no more concern for his
own interest than for that of his fellows; it seems evident, that the use of justice would, in
this case, be suspended by such an extensive benevolence, nor would the divisions and
barriers of property and obligation have ever been thought of. Why should I bind another,
by a deed or promise, to do me any good office, when I know that he is already prompted,
by the strongest inclination, to seek my happiness, and would, of himself, perform the
desired service;