An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals | Page 6

principle and constitutes
virtue our happiness, and vice our misery; it is probable, I say, that this final sentence
depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole
species. For what else can have an influence of this nature? But in order to pave the way

for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we
find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions
drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts
fixed and ascertained. Some species of beauty, especially the natural kinds, on their first
appearance, command our affection and approbation; and where they fail of this effect, it
is impossible for any reasoning to redress their influence, or adapt them better to our taste
and sentiment. But in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is
requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false
relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are just grounds to
conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this latter species, and demands the
assistance of our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a suitable influence on the
human mind.
But though this question, concerning the general principles of morals, be curious and
important, it is needless for us, at present, to employ farther care in our researches
concerning it. For if we can be so happy, in the course of this enquiry, as to discover the
true origin of morals, it will then easily appear how far either sentiment or reason enters
into all determinations of this nature [Footnote: See Appendix I]. In order to attain this
purpose, we shall endeavour to follow a very simple method: we shall analyse that
complication of mental qualities, which form what, in common life, we call Personal
Merit: we shall consider every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either
of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit or sentiment or faculty,
which, if ascribed to any person, implies either praise or blame, and may enter into any
panegyric or satire of his character and manners. The quick sensibility, which, on this
head, is so universal among mankind, gives a philosopher sufficient assurance, that he
can never be considerably mistaken in framing the catalogue, or incur any danger of
misplacing the objects of his contemplation: he needs only enter into his own breast for a
moment, and consider whether or not he should desire to have this or that quality ascribed
to him, and whether such or such an imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy.
The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgement of this
nature; and as every tongue possesses one set of words which are taken in a good sense,
and another in the opposite, the least acquaintance with the idiom suffices, without any
reasoning, to direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blameable qualities of
men. The only object of reasoning is to discover the circumstances on both sides, which
are common to these qualities; to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities
agree on the one hand, and the blameable on the other; and thence to reach the foundation
of ethics, and find those universal principles, from which all censure or approbation is
ultimately derived. As this is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only
expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims
from a comparison of particular instances. The other scientific method, where a general
abstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of
inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection
of human nature, and is a common source of illusion and mistake in this as well as in
other subjects. Men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural
philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those which are derived from
experience. It is full time they should attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions;
and reject every system of ethics, however subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on

fact and observation.
We shall begin our enquiry on this head by the consideration of the social virtues,
Benevolence and Justice. The explication of them will probably give us an opening by
which the others may be accounted for.

SECTION II.

OF BENEVOLENCE.


PART I.

It may be esteemed, perhaps, a superfluous task to prove, that the benevolent or softer
affections are estimable; and wherever they appear, engage the approbation and good-will
of mankind. The epithets SOCIABLE, GOOD-NATURED, HUMANE, MERCIFUL,