An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding | Page 8

all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or
inward, are strong and vivid: the limits between them are more exactly determined: nor is
it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them. When we entertain, therefore,
any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is
but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea
derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion.
By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute,
which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.[1]
[1] It is probable that no more was meant by those, who denied innate ideas, than that all
ideas were copies of our impressions; though it must be confessed, that the terms, which
they employed, were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent
all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by innate? If innate be equivalent to
natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or
natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is
uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, contemporary to our birth, the
dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking
begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word idea, seems to be
commonly taken in a very loose sense, by LOCKE and others; as standing for any of our
perceptions, our sensations and passions, as well as thoughts. Now in this sense, I should
desire to know, what can be meant by asserting, that self-love, or resentment of injuries,
or the passion between the sexes is not innate!
But admitting these terms, impressions and ideas, in the sense above explained, and
understanding by innate, what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then
may we assert that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate.
To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that LOCKE was betrayed into this
question by the schoolmen, who, making use of undefined terms, draw out their disputes
to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in question. A like ambiguity and
circumlocution seem to run through that philosopher's reasonings on this as well as most
other subjects.

SECTION III.
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

18. It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or
ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they
introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious
thinking or discourse this is so observable that any particular thought, which breaks in
upon the regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even
in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we
reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a
connexion upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the
loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed
something which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person
who broke the thread of discourse might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved
in his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him from the subject of
conversation. Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the least
connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, expressive of ideas, the most
compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other: a certain proof that the simple ideas,
comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal principle,
which had an equal influence on all mankind.
19. Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are connected
together; I do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the
principles of association; a subject, however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there
appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, Resemblance,
Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect.
That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted. A
picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original[2]: the mention of one apartment in a
building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others[3]: and if we
think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it[4]. But
that this enumeration is complete, and that there are no other principles of association
except these, may be difficult to prove to the