An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding | Page 4

unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The
stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a moment, is oppressed. And many, through
cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with
reverence and submission, as their legal sovereigns.
7. But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from such researches,
and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an
opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret
recesses of the enemy? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will
at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of human reason. For,
besides, that many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually recalling such
topics; besides this, I say, the motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in
the sciences; since, however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is still
room to hope, that the industry, good fortune, or improved sagacity of succeeding
generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages. Each adventurous genius
will still leap at the arduous prize, and find himself stimulated, rather that discouraged, by
the failures of his predecessors; while he hopes that the glory of achieving so hard an
adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of freeing learning, at once, from
these abstruse questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding,
and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted
for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at
ease ever after: And must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy
the false and adulterate. Indolence, which, to some persons, affords a safeguard against
this deceitful philosophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity; and despair, which,
at some moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes and
expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted for all
persons and all dispositions; and is alone able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and
metaphysical jargon, which, being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a
manner impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science and wisdom.
8. Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate enquiry, the most uncertain and
disagreeable part of learning, there are many positive advantages, which result from an
accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature. It is remarkable
concerning the operations of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet,
whenever they become the object of reflexion, they seem involved in obscurity; nor can
the eye readily find those lines and boundaries, which discriminate and distinguish them.
The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be
apprehended in an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved
by habit and reflexion. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science barely to
know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class
them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie
involved, when made the object of reflexion and enquiry. This talk of ordering and
distinguishing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to external bodies, the
objects of our senses, rises in its value, when directed towards the operations of the mind,

in proportion to the difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing it. And if we
can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and
powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more obvious this
science may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contemptible still must the
ignorance of it be esteemed, in all pretenders to learning and philosophy.
Nor can there remain any suspicion, that this science is uncertain and chimerical; unless
we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculation, and
even action. It cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed with several powers and
faculties, that these powers are distinct from each other, that what is really distinct to the
immediate perception may be distinguished by reflexion; and consequently, that there is a
truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject, and a truth and falsehood, which
lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions
of this kind, such as those between the will and understanding, the imagination and
passions, which fall within the comprehension of every human creature; and the finer and
more philosophical distinctions are no less real