An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding

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Title: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
Author: David Hume et al
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AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.
BY DAVID HUME

Extracted from: Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding, and Concerning the
Principles of Morals, By David Hume.
Reprinted from The Posthumous Edition of 1777, and Edited with Introduction,
Comparative Tables of Contents, and Analytical Index by L.A. Selby-Bigge, M.A., Late
Fellow of University College, Oxford.
Second Edition, 1902

CONTENTS
I. Of the different Species of Philosophy II. Of the Origin of Ideas III. Of the Association
of Ideas IV. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding V.
Sceptical Solution of these Doubts VI. Of Probability VII. Of the Idea of necessary
Connexion VIII. Of Liberty and Necessity IX. Of the Reason of Animals X. Of Miracles
XI. Of a particular Providence and of a future State XII. Of the academical or sceptical
Philosophy

INDEX

SECTION I.
OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PHILOSOPHY.
1. Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different
manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment,
instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for
action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and
avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and
according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is
allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most
amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their
subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination,
and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from
common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths
of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the
soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference

between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but
bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully
attained the end of all their labours.
2. The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than
an active being, and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners.
They regard human nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny
examine it, in order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our
sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour.
They think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed,
beyond controversy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for
ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able
to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they
are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular instances to general
principles, they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not
satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human
curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and even
unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise;
and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they
can discover some