An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findin | Page 4

generation and distribution, as a whole, are resistant to failure, despite potentially severe local damage. These systems would suffer serious local outages, particularly in the first several days after the event, but would resume service over a few weeks to months. The principal difficulty would be the greatly increased need for these systems in the first few days after the event, when lifesaving activities would be paramount.
Portions of the San Francisco Bay Area and of the Los Angeles Area contain substantial concentrations of manufacturing capacity for guided missiles and space vehicles, semiconductors, aircraft parts, electronic computing equipment, and airframes. Their specific vulnerability to the postulated earthquakes was not analyzed. In the event of major damage, however, the long-term impacts may be mitigated somewhat by such measures as the use of underutilized capacity located elsewhere, substitution of capacity from other industries, imports, use of other products, and drawing-down of inventories.
Since we have not recently experienced a catastrophic earthquake in the United States, there are many unknowns which must be estimated with best judgment. This is true particularly for the response of individuals as well as governmental and other institutions. Popular assumptions of post-disaster behavior include antisocial behavior and the need for martial law, the breakdown of government institutions, and the requirement for the quick assertion of outside leadership and control. Practical experience and field studies of disasters, however, indicate that these assumptions are not necessarily correct. On the contrary, the impacts of the disaster commonly produce a sense of solidarity and cooperativeness among the survivors. Nonetheless, the perception remains among emergency response officials that there will be an increased need for law enforcement following the event.
Another major unknown involves whether a medium or short-term warning of the event would be possible and how such a warning could be utilized most effectively. The technology for earthquake prediction is in an early stage of development and, therefore it is problematical that researchers will succeed in issuing a short-term warning before a catastrophic earthquake, should the event occur in the next few years. Yet as research progresses, scientifically-based, intermediate-term warnings are possible, but subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Consequently, response preparations must be made for both an earthquake without warning, and one with a short-or intermediate-term warning, possibly with a significant level of uncertainty.
E. CAPABILITY FOR RESPONSE
Planning for response to a large-scale disaster is a complicated process encompassing many variables such as population densities and distribution characteristics; land-use patterns and construction techniques; geographical configurations; vulnerability of transportation; communications and other lifeline systems; complex response operations; long-term physical, social, and economic recovery policies. These factors, together with the realization that an earthquake has the potential for being the greatest single-event catastrophe in California, make it incumbent upon the State to maintain as high a level of emergency readiness as is practicable, and to provide guidance and assistance to local jurisdictions desiring to plan and prepare for such events. Annex 2 reviews the general nature of preparedness planning and the basic characteristics of California and Federal Government plans.
Federal, State, and local emergency response capabilities are judged to be adequate for moderate earthquakes--those that are most likely to occur frequently in California and cause property damage in the range of $1 billion. Such an event, however, would severely tax existing resources and provide a major test of management relationships among different governmental levels. Federal, State, and local officials, however, are quick to point out serious shortcomings in their ability to respond to a catastrophic earthquake. An analysis of the preparedness posture of 60 local governments, 34 California State organizations, and 17 Federal agencies, carried out by the California Office of Emergency Services (OES) and FEMA, indicates that response to such an earthquake would become disorganized and largely ineffective. Many governmental units have generalized earthquake response plans, some have tailored earthquake plans, and several plans are regularly exercised. The coordination of these plans among jurisdictions, agencies, and levels of government, however, is inadequate. In addition, the potential for prediction is not incorporated; long-term recovery issues are not considered; and communications problems are significant, as discussed above. Overall, Federal preparedness is deficient at this time. Early reaction to a catastrophic event would likely be characterized by delays, ineffective response, and ineffectively coordinated delivery of support.
FEMA Region IX (San Francisco) has drafted an Earthquake Response Plan for the San Francisco Bay area. Annex 2 gives an overview of this draft plan. This is a site-specific plan for response to potential catastrophic earthquake occurrences. The emergency response portion relies upon a decentralized approach which provides for Federal disaster support activities to be assigned to selected Federal agencies by mission assignment letters. No specific plans have been prepared in this detail for other seismic risk areas, although it is expected that the Bay Area plan could be easily adapted to