An Account of the Proceedings on the Trial of Susan B. Anthony | Page 7

JUDGE SELDEN: I object to that upon the ground that it is
incompetent, that if they refuse to allow her to be sworn here, they
should be excluded from producing any evidence that she gave
elsewhere, especially when they want to give the version which the
United States officer took of her evidence.
THE COURT: Go on.
By MR. CROWLEY:
Q. State whether she stated on that examination, under oath, that she
had talked or consulted with Judge Henry R. Selden in relation to her
right to vote?
A. She did.
Q. State whether she was asked, upon that examination, if the advice
given her by Judge Henry R. Selden would or did make any difference
in her action in voting, or in substance that?
A. She stated on the cross-examination, "I should have made the same
endeavor to vote that I did had I not consulted Judge Selden. I didn't
consult any one before I registered. I was not influenced by his advice
in the matter at all; have been resolved to vote, the first time I was at
home 30 days, for a number of years."

Cross-examination by MR. VAN VOORHEES:
Q. Mr. Pound, was she asked there if she had any doubt about her right
to vote, and did she answer "Not a particle?"
A. She stated "Had no doubt as to my right to vote," on the direct
examination.
Q. There was a stenographic reporter there, was there not?
A. A reporter was there taking notes.
Q. Was not this question put to her "Did you have any doubt yourself
of your right to vote?" and did she not answer "Not a particle?"
THE COURT: Well, he says so, that she had no doubt of her right to
vote.
JUDGE SELDEN: I beg leave to state, in regard to my own testimony,
Miss Anthony informs me that I was mistaken in the fact that my
advice was before her registry. It was my recollection that it was on her
way to the registry, but she states to me now that she was registered
and came immediately to my office. In that respect I was under a
mistake.
Evidence closed.

ARGUMENT OF MR. SELDEN FOR THE DEFENDANT.
The defendant is indicted under the 19th section of the Act of Congress
of May 31, 1870 (16 St. at L., 144,), for "voting without having a
lawful right to vote."
The words of the Statute, so far as they are material in this case, are as
follows:
"If at any election for representative or delegate in the Congress of the

United States, any person shall knowingly ... vote without having a
lawful right to vote ... every such person shall be deemed guilty of a
crime, ... and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding $500, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three
years, or by both, in the discretion of the court, and shall pay the costs
of prosecution."
The only alleged ground of illegality of the defendant's vote is that she
is a woman. If the same act had been done by her brother under the
same circumstances, the act would have been not only innocent, but
honorable and laudable; but having been done by a woman it is said to
be a crime. The crime therefore consists not in the act done, but in the
simple fact that the person doing it was a woman and not a man. I
believe this is the first instance in which a woman has been arraigned in
a criminal court, merely on account of her sex.
If the advocates of female suffrage had been allowed to choose the
point of attack to be made upon their position, they could not have
chosen it more favorably for themselves; and I am disposed to thank
those who have been instrumental in this proceeding, for presenting it
in the form of a criminal prosecution.
Women have the same interest that men have in the establishment and
maintenance of good government; they are to the same extent as men
bound to obey the laws; they suffer to the same extent by bad laws, and
profit to the same extent by good laws; and upon principles of equal
justice, as it would seem, should be allowed equally with men, to
express their preference in the choice of law-makers and rulers. But
however that may be, no greater absurdity, to use no harsher term,
could be presented, than that of rewarding men and punishing women,
for the same act, without giving to women any voice in the question
which should be rewarded, and which punished.
I am aware, however, that we are here to be governed by the
Constitution and laws as they are, and that if the defendant has