Against Home Rule | Page 4

Parliament in the time of Tyrconnel again
began to prepare for the invasion of England by an attempt to destroy
the Ulster plantation. The settlers had their estates confiscated, the
Protestant clergy were driven out and English sympathisers outlawed
by name, in the "hugest Bill of Attainder which the world has seen."
Admiral Lord Charles Beresford points out the danger from a naval
point of view of the French attempts to use Ireland as a base for
operations against England, both under Louis XIV. and under the
Republican Directory. He quotes Admiral Mahan as saying that the
movement which designed to cut the English communications in St.
George's Channel while an invading party landed in the south of
Ireland was a strictly strategic movement and would be as dangerous to
England now as it was in 1690. When Grattan extorted from England's
weakness the unworkable and impracticable constitution of 1782, the
danger which had always been present became immensely increased. In
less than three years from the period of boasted final adjustment,

Ireland came to a breach with England on the important question of
trade and navigation. Then, again, at the time of the Regency, the Irish
Parliament was actually ready to choose a person in whom to rest the
sovereign executive power of the nation, different from him whom the
British Parliament were prepared to designate.
In 1795, when the French had made themselves masters of Brabant,
Flanders, and Holland, the rebel government of United Irishmen was so
well-established in Ireland that, as Lord Clare, the Irish Chancellor,
subsequently admitted in the House of Lords, Ireland was for some
weeks in a state of actual separation from Great Britain. When the great
Rebellion of 1798 broke out, the French Directory sent assistance to the
Irish rebels in order to facilitate the greater scheme--the conquest of
England and of Europe. When we come to estimate the danger which
the grant of Home Rule to Ireland would bring to the safety of England,
we are faced with two considerations. In the first place, the movements
of the French in the past were, as we have said, strategic. Given an Irish
Parliament that was hostile to England, or at least dubious in her
loyalty to this country, the movement of a hostile fleet against our
communications would be as dangerous now as it was in the past.
When we try to estimate what would be the feelings of an Irish
Government when England was at war, we have to consider not only
the speeches of avowed enemies of the Empire like Major McBride and
the Irish Americans, but we have also to remember the attitude adopted
upon all questions of foreign policy by the more responsible
Nationalists of the type of Mr. Dillon. Not only have the Irish
Nationalist party consistently opposed every warlike operation that
British Governments have found to be necessary, but they have also
fervently attacked the Powers on the Continent of Europe that have
been suspected of friendship to England. We have only to imagine the
element of weakness and disunion which would be introduced into our
foreign policy by an Irish Parliament that passed resolutions regarding
the policy of the Governments, say, of Russia and of France, in order to
realise the immense dangers of setting up such a Parliament when we
are again confronted with a mighty Confederation of opponents in
Europe. It is admitted that the next European war will be decided by the

events of the first few days. In order to succeed, we shall have to strike
and strike quickly. But in order that there should be swift and effective
action, there should be only one Government to be consulted. The Irish
Ministry that was not actively hostile, but only unsympathetic and
dilatory, might, in many ways, fatally embarrass Ministers at
Westminster.
Moreover, another complication has been introduced by the
dependence of England upon Irish food supplies. Lord Percy points out
that there are two stages in every naval war; first, the actual
engagement, and then the blockade or destruction of the ships of the
defeated country. He points out that, even after the destruction of the
French Navy at Trafalgar, the damage done to British oversea
commerce was very great. Modern conditions of warfare have made
blockade an infinitely more difficult and precarious operation, and we
must therefore face the certainty that hostile cruisers will escape and
interfere with our oversea supplies of food. Since Ireland lies directly
across our trade routes, it is probable that the majority of our food
supplies will be derived from Ireland or carried through that country.
But Irish Ministers would not have forgotten the lesson of the famine,
when food was exported from Ireland though the people starved.
Curious as it may seem, Ireland, though a great exporting