A Treatise of Human Nature | Page 2

OF THE LOVE OF FAME SECT. XII OF THE PRIDE AND HUMILITY OF ANIMALS



PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED
SECT. I OF THE OBJECT AND CAUSES OF LOVE AND HATRED SECT. II EXPERIMENTS TO CONFIRM THIS SYSTEM SECT. III DIFFICULTIES SOLVED SECT. IV OF THE LOVE OF RELATIONS SECT. V OF OUR ESTEEM FOR THE RICH AND POWERFUL SECT. VI OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER SECT. VII OF COMPASSION SECT. VIII OF MALICE AND ENVY SECT. IX OF THE MIXTURE OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER WITH COMPASSION AND MALICE SECT. X OF RESPECT AND CONTEMPT SECT. XI OF THE AMOROUS PASSION, OR LOVE BETWIXT THE SEXES SECT. XII OF THE LOVE AND HATRED OF ANIMALS



PART III OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS
SECT. I OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY SECT. II THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED SECT. III OF THE INFLUENCING MOTIVES OF THE WILL SECT. IV OF THE CAUSES OF THE VIOLENT PASSIONS SECT. V OF THE EFFECTS OF CUSTOM SECT. VI OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE IMAGINATION ON THE PASSIONS SECT. VII OF CONTIGUITY AND DISTANCE IN SPACE AND TIME SECT. VIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED SECT. IX OF THE DIRECT PASSIONS SECT. X OF CURIOSITY, OR THE LOVE OF TRUTH
BOOK III OF MORALS



PART I OF VIRTUE AND VICE IN GENERAL
SECT. I MORAL DISTINCTIONS NOT DERIVED FROM REASON SECT. II MORAL DISTINCTIONS DERIVED FROM A MORAL SENSE



PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE
SECT. I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? SECT. II OF THE ORIGIN OF JUSTICE AND PROPERTY SECT. III OF THE RULES WHICH DETERMINE PROPERTY SECT. IV OF THE TRANSFERENCE OF PROPERTY BY CONSENT SECT. V OF THE OBLIGATION OF PROMISES SECT. VI SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE SECT. VII OF THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT SECT. VIII OF THE SOURCE OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. IX OF THE MEASURES OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. X OF THE OBJECTS OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. XI OF THE LAWS OF NATIONS SECT. XII OF CHASTITY AND MODESTY



PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES
SECT. I OF THE ORIGIN OF THE NATURAL VIRTUES AND VICES SECT. II OF GREATNESS OF MIND SECT. III OF GOODNESS AND BENEVOLENCE SECT. IV OF NATURAL ABILITIES SECT. V SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING THE NATURAL VIRTUES SECT. VI CONCLUSION OF THIS BOOK
APPENDIX TO THE TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE

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VOL. I OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

ADVERTISEMENT.

My design in the present work is sufficiently explained in the Introduction. The reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have there planned out to myself, are not treated of in these two volumes. The subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this natural division, in order to try the taste of the public. If I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of Human Nature. The approbation of the public I consider as the greatest reward of my labours; but am determined to regard its judgment, whatever it be, as my best instruction.

INTRODUCTION.

Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.
Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and