A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge | Page 5

the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto.
For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of
general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to
imagine that they have not the FACULTY OF ABSTRACTING, or
making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other
general signs." And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we may suppose
that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men,
and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and
which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas
at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot
deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do,

some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; but it
is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses.
They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have
not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of
ABSTRACTION." Essay on Human Understanding, II. xi. 10 and 11. I
readily agree with this learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by
no means attain to ABSTRACTION. But then if this be made the
distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of
those that pass for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason
that is here assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have
abstract general ideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or
any other general signs; which is built on this supposition--that the
making use of words implies the having general ideas. From which it
follows that men who use language are able to ABSTRACT or
GENERALIZE their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the
author will further appear by his answering the question he in another
place puts: "Since all things that exist are only particulars, how come
we by general terms?" His answer is: "Words become general by being
made the signs of general ideas."--Essay on Human Understanding, IV.
iii. 6. But [Note. 1] it seems that a word becomes general by being
made the sign, not of an ABSTRACT general idea, but of several
particular ideas [Note. 2], any one of which it indifferently suggests to
the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of motion is
proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatever has extension is
divisible," these propositions are to be understood of motion and
extension in general; and nevertheless it will not follow that they
suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved, or any
determinate direction and velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract
general idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid,
neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any other
determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever particular motion I
consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or
oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds equally
true. As does the other of every particular extension, it matters not
whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that magnitude or
figure.

[Note 1: "TO THIS I CANNOT ASSENT, BEING OF OPINION," edit
of 1710.] [Note 2: Of the same sort.]
12. EXISTENCE OF GENERAL IDEAS ADMITTED.--By observing
how ideas become general we may the better judge how words are
made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there
are general ideas, but only that there are any ABSTRACT GENERAL
IDEAS; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein there is mention
of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by
ABSTRACTION, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. Now,
if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we
can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which,
considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to
represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the SAME SORT. To
make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is
demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws,
for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a
particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its signification general,
since, as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so
that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other
words, of a line in general. And, as that particular line becomes