A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge | Page 2

to truth.
But, to the end this may not suffer, I make it my request that the reader
suspend his judgment till he has once at least read the whole through
with that degree of attention and thought which the subject-matter shall
seem to deserve. For, as there are some passages that, taken by
themselves, are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross
misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd consequences,
which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will appear not to follow
from them; so likewise, though the whole should be read over, yet, if
this be done transiently, it is very probable my sense may be mistaken;
but to a thinking reader, I flatter myself it will be throughout clear and
obvious. As for the characters of novelty and singularity which some of
the following notions may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make
any apology on that account. He must surely be either very weak, or
very little acquainted with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is

capable of demonstration, for no other reason but because it is newly
known, and contrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus much I
thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty
censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion before
they rightly comprehend it.

INTRODUCTION

1. Philosophy being nothing else but THE STUDY OF WISDOM AND
TRUTH, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent
most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of
mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less
disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we
see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain
common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most
part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing THAT IS FAMILIAR
appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not
of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of
becoming SCEPTICS. But no sooner do we depart from sense and
instinct to follow the light of a superior principle, to reason, meditate,
and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in
our minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to
comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover
themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason,
we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and
inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in
speculation, till at length, having wandered through many intricate
mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit
down in a forlorn Scepticism.
2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the
natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, the
faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the
SUPPORT and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the INWARD
ESSENCE and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being

finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be
wondered at if it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it
is impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of
infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite.
3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault
originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of
them. IT IS A HARD THING TO SUPPOSE THAT RIGHT
DEDUCTIONS FROM TRUE PRINCIPLES SHOULD EVER END
IN CONSEQUENCES WHICH CANNOT BE MAINTAINED or
made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more
bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for
that knowledge which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were
not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which,
whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually
furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to
satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater
part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused
philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing
to ourselves--that we have first raised a dust and then complain we
cannot see.
4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles
are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those
absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy;
insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable,
conceiving