A Theologico-Political Treatise part 4 | Page 8

Benedict de Spinoza
liberty every man
possesses to preserve his existence, a liberty limited by the edicts of the
sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority: for when a man
has transferred to another his right of living as he likes, which was only
limited by his power, that is, has transferred his liberty and power of
self-defence, he is bound to live as that other dictates, and to trust to
him entirely for his defence. (70) Wrong takes place when a citizen, or
subject, is forced by another to undergo some loss or pain in
contradiction to the authority of the law, or the edict of the sovereign
power.
(16:71) Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community: nor can
it ever accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has the
right to do what he likes. (72) It can only arise, therefore, between
private persons, who are bound by law and right not to injure one
another. (73) Justice consists in the habitual rendering to every man his
lawful due: injustice consists in depriving a man, under the pretence of
legality, of what the laws, rightly interpreted, would allow him. (74)
These last are also called equity and iniquity, because those who
administer the laws are bound to show no respect of persons, but to
account all men equal, and to defend every man's right equally, neither
envying the rich nor despising the poor.
[16:6](75) The men of two states become allies, when for the sake of
avoiding war, or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each
other no hurt, but on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity arises,

each retaining his independence. (76) Such a covenant is valid so long
as its basis of danger or advantage is in force: no one enters into an
engagement, or is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a
hope of some accruing good, or the fear of some evil: if this basis be
removed the compact thereby becomes void: this has been abundantly
shown by experience. (77) For although different states make treaties
not to harm one another, they always take every possible precaution
against such treaties being broken by the stronger party, and do not rely
on the compact, unless there is a sufficiently obvious object and
advantage to both parties in observing it. (78) Otherwise they would
fear a breach of faith, nor would there be any wrong done thereby: for
who in his proper senses, and aware of the right of the sovereign power,
would trust in the promises of one who has the will and the power to do
what he likes, and who aims solely at the safety and advantage of his
dominion? (79) Moreover, if we consult loyalty and religion, we shall
see that no one in possession of power ought to abide by his promises
to the injury of his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises without
breaking the engagement he made with his subjects, by which both he
and they are most solemnly bound. (80) An enemy is one who lives
apart from the state, and does not recognize its authority either as a
subject or as an ally. It is not hatred which makes a man an enemy, but
the rights of the state. (81) The rights of the state are the same in regard
to him who does not recognize by any compact the state authority, as
they are against him who has done the state an injury: it has the right to
force him as best it can, either to submit, or to contract an alliance.
[16:7] (82) Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects, who by
compact, either tacit or expressed, have transferred all their rights to the
state: a subject is said to have committed this crime when he has
attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the sovereign power, or to
place it in different hands. (83) I say, has attempted, for if punishment
were not to overtake him till he had succeeded, it would often come too
late, the sovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred
already.
(16:84) I also say, has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the
sovereign power, and I recognize no difference whether such an
attempt should be followed by public loss or public gain. (85)
Whatever be his reason for acting, the crime is treason, and he is rightly

condemned: in war, everyone would admit the justice of his sentence.
(86) If a man does not keep to his post, but approaches the enemy
without the knowledge of his commander, whatever may be his motive,
so long as he acts on his own motion, even if he advances with the
design of defeating the enemy, he is rightly put to death, because
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