A Public Appeal for Redress to the Corporation and Overseers of Harvard University | Page 3

of universals is divided from mine by the whole vast chasm between
realism and idealism. The two theories contradict each other absolutely,
uncompromisingly, irreconcilably: Hegel's is a theory of "absolute
idealism" or "pure thought" (reines Denken), that is, of thought
absolutely independent of experience, while mine is a theory of
"scientific realism," that is, of thought absolutely dependent upon
experience. It is quite immaterial here which theory is the true one; the
only point involved at present is that the two theories flatly contradict
each other, and that it is self-evidently impossible that either could be
"borrowed," consciously or unconsciously, from the other. If Dr. Royce
had ever done any hard thinking on the theory of universals, or if he
had the slightest comprehension of the problems it involves, he would
never have been so rash as to charge me with "borrowing" my theory
from Hegel, and thus to commit himself irrevocably to a defence of the

absurd; but eagerness to accuse another has betrayed him into a
position whence it is impossible for him to escape with honor. Solely
by misdescribing my philosophy as "essentially idealistic" when it
openly and constantly and emphatically avows itself to be essentially
realistic, could Dr. Royce give the faintest color of plausibility to his
monstrous and supremely ridiculous accusation of plagiarism; solely by
presuming upon the public ignorance both of Hegel and of my own
work could he dare to publish such an accusation to the world. These
gross misrepresentations, however, he did not hesitate to make, since
they were necessary in order to pave the way to a third and still grosser
misrepresentation on which he apparently had set his heart: namely,
that, after borrowing the whole substance of my philosophy from Hegel,
I have been guilty of making "vast and extravagant pretensions" as to
my own "novelty," "originality," and "profundity," not only with regard
to my published books, but also with regard to my "still unpublished
system of philosophy." His words are these:--
"Of novelty, good or bad, the book contains, indeed, despite its vast
pretensions, hardly a sign."
"It is due also to the extravagant pretensions which he frequently makes
of late as to the originality and profundity of his still unpublished
system of philosophy, to give the reader some hint of what so far
appears to be the nature of our author's contributions to philosophical
reflection."
Precisely what have been these alleged "pretensions"? Dr. Royce cites
only three instances.
I. He first garbles a sentence in the prefatory Note to "The Way out of
Agnosticism," by quoting only one phrase from it. The sentence in full
is this: "By a wholly new line of reasoning, drawn exclusively from
those sources [science and philosophy], this book aims to show that, in
order to refute agnosticism and establish enlightened theism, nothing is
now necessary but to philosophize that very scientific method which
agnosticism barbarously misunderstands and misuses." There is no
"pretension" whatever in these words, except that the general "line of
reasoning" set forth in the book is, as a whole, different from that of

other books. If not, why publish it? Or, without the same cause, why
publish any book? I see no reason to recall or to modify this perfectly
true statement; Dr. Royce, at least, has shown none. The "novelty" of
the book lies in its very attempt to evolve philosophy as a whole out of
the scientific method itself, as "observation, hypothesis, and
experimental verification," by developing the theory of universals
which is implicit in that purely experiential method; and Dr. Royce
does not even try to prove that Hegel, or anybody else, has ever made
just such an attempt as that. Unless there can be shown somewhere a
parallel attempt, the statement is as undeniably true as it is certainly
unpretentious.
II. Next, Dr. Royce extracts these sentences from the body of the book
(I supply in brackets words which he omitted): "The first great task of
philosophy is to lay deep and solid foundations for the expansion [and
ideal perfection] of human knowledge in a bold, new, and true theory
of universals. For so-called modern philosophy rests complacently in a
theory of universals which is thoroughly mediæval or antiquated."
What personal pretension, even of the mildest sort, can be conceived to
lurk in these innocent words? I did not say that I have succeeded in
performing that "task"; I repeat now what I have often said and what I
meant then; namely, that modern science has unawares performed it
already, that I have faithfully tried to formulate and further apply what
science has done, and that I respectfully submit the result (so far as
already published), not to such critics as Dr. Royce, but to able, learned,
and magnanimous students of philosophy everywhere.
III. Lastly, though employing