A Little Book of Stoicism | Page 8

the consequence that it is dark is false also. But if we say, "The
earth flies," which was regarded as not only false but impossible
[Footnote: Here we may recall the warning of Arago to call nothing
impossible outside the range of pure mathematics] this involves the true
consequence that the earth is. Though the simple syllogism is not
alluded to in the sketch which Diogenes Laertius gives of the Stoic
logic, it is of frequent occurrence in the accounts left us of their
arguments. Take for instance the syllogism wherewith Zeno advocated
the cause of temperance-- One does not commit a secret to a man who
is drunk. One does commit a secret to a good man. A good man will
not get drunk.
The chain argument which we wrongly call the Sorites was also a
favorite resource with the Stoics. If a single syllogism did not suffice to
argue men into virtue surely a condensed series must be effectual. And
so they demonstrated the sufficiency of wisdom for happiness as
follows---- The wise man is temperate The temperate is constant The
constant is unperturbed The unperturbed is free from sorrow Whoso is
free from sorrow is happy The wise man is happy
The delight which the early Stoics took in this pure play of the intellect
led them to pounce with avidity upon the abundant stock of fallacies
current among the Greeks of their time. These seem--most of them--to

have been invented by the Megarians and especially by Eubulides of
Miletus a disciple of Eucleides but they became associated with the
Stoics both by friends and foes who either praise their subtlety or
deride their solemnity in dealing with them. Chrysippus himself was
not above propounding such sophisms as the following--
Whoever divulges the mysteries to the uninitiated commits impiety The
hierophant divulged the mysteries to the uninitiated The hierophant
commits impiety
Anything that you say passes through your mouth You say a wagon A
wagon passes through your mouth
He is said to have written eleven books on the No-one fallacy. But what
seems to have exercised most of his ingenuity was the famous Liar, the
invention of which is ascribed to Eubulides. This fallacy in its simplest
form is as follows. If you say truly that you are telling a lie, are you
lying or telling the truth? Chrysippus set this down as inexplicable.
Nevertheless he was far from declining to discuss it. For we find in the
list of his works a treatise in five books on the Inexplicables an
Introduction to the Liar and Liars for Introduction, six books on the
Liar itself, a work directed against those who thought that such
propositions were both false and true, another against those who
professed to solve the Liar by a process of division, three books on the
solution of the Liar, and finally a polemic against those who asserted
that the Liar had its premises false. It was well for poor Philetas of Cos
that he ended his days before Chrysippus was born, though as it was he
grew thin and died of the Liar, and his epitaph served as a solemn
reminder to poets not to meddle with logic--
Philetas of Cos am I 'Twas the Liar who made me die And the bad
nights caused thereby.
Perhaps we owe him an apology for the translation.
ETHIC
We have already had to touch upon the psychology of the Stoics in

connection with the first principles of logic. It is no less necessary to do
so now in dealing with the foundation of ethic.
The Stoics we are told reckoned that there were eight parts of the soul.
These were the five senses, the organ of sound, the intellect and the
reproductive principle. The passions, it will be observed, are
conspicuous by their absence. For the Stoic theory was that the
passions were simply the intellect in a diseased state owing to the
perversions of falsehood. This is why the Stoics would not parley with
passion, conceiving that if once it were let into the citadel of the soul it
would supplant the rightful ruler. Passion and reason were not two
things which could be kept separate in which case it might be hoped
that reason would control passion, but were two states of the same
thing--a worse and a better.
The unperturbed intellect was the legitimate monarch in the kingdom of
man. Hence the Stoics commonly spoke of it as the leading principle.
This was the part of the soul which received phantasies and it was also
that in which impulses were generated with which we have now more
particularly to do.
Impulse or appetition was the principle in the soul which impelled to
action. In an unperverted state it was directed only to things in