A Little Book of Stoicism | Page 6

phantasy was called
"comprehension," as indicating the firm hold that the soul thus took of
reality. A gripping phantasy was defined as one which was stamped
and impressed from an existing object, in virtue of that object itself, in
such a way as it could not be from a non-existent object. The clause "in
virtue of that object itself" was put into the definition to provide against
such a case as that of the mad Orestes, who takes his sister to be a Fury.
There the impression was derived from an existing object, but not from
that object as such, but as coloured by the imagination of the percipient.
The criterion of truth then was no other than the gripping phantasy.
Such at least was the doctrine of the earlier Stoics, but the later added a
saving clause, "when there is no impediment." For they were pressed
by their opponents with such imaginary cases as that of Admetus,
seeing his wife before him in very deed, and yet not believing it to be
her. But here there was an impediment. Admetus did not believe that
the dead could rise. Again Menelaus did not believe in the real Helen
when he found her on the island of Pharos. But here again there was an
impediment. For Menelaus could not have been expected to know that
he had been for ten years fighting for a phantom. When, however, there
was no such impediment, then they said the gripping phantasy did
indeed deserve its name, for it almost took men by the hair of the head
and dragged them to assent.
So far we have used "phantasy" only of real or imaginary impressions
of sense. But the term was not thus restricted by the Stoics, who
divided phantasies into sensible and not sensible. The latter came
through the understanding and were of bodiless things which could
only be grasped by reason. The ideas of Plato they declared existed
only in our minds. Horse, man, and animal had no substantial existence
but were phantasms of the soul. The Stoics were thus what we should
call Conceptualists.
Comprehension too was used in a wider sense than that in which we

have so far employed it. There was comprehension by the senses as of
white and black, of rough and smooth, but there was also
comprehension by the reason of demonstrative conclusions such as that
the gods exist and that they exercise providence. Here we are reminded
of Locke's declaration: "'Tis as certain there's a God as that the opposite
angles made by the intersection of two straight lines are equal." The
Stoics indeed had great affinities with that thinker or rather he with
them. The Stoic account of the manner in which the mind arrives at its
ideas might almost be taken from the first book of Locke's Essay. As
many as nine ways are enumerated of which the first corresponds to
simple ideas--
(1) by presentation, as objects of sense
(2) by likeness, as the idea of Socrates from his picture
(3) by analogy, that is, by increase or decrease, as ideas of giants and
pigmies from men, or as the notion of the centre of the earth, which is
reached by the consideration of smaller spheres.
(4) by transposition, as the idea of men with eyes in their breasts.
(5) by composition, as the idea of a Centaur.
(6) by opposition, as the idea of death from that of life.
(7) by a kind of transition, as the meaning of words and the idea of
place.
(8)by nature, as the notion of the just and the good
(9)by privation, as handless
The Stoics resembled Locke again in endeavoring to give such a
definition of knowledge as should cover at once the reports of the
senses and the relation between ideas. Knowledge was defined by them
as a sure comprehension or a habit in the acceptance of phantasies
which was not liable to be changed by reason. On a first hearing these

definitions might seem limited to sense knowledge but if we bethink
ourselves of the wider meanings of comprehension and of phantasy, we
see that the definitions apply as they were meant to apply to the mind's
grasp upon the force of a demonstration no less than upon the existence
of a physical object.
Zeno, with that touch of oriental symbolism which characterized him,
used to illustrate to his disciples the steps to knowledge by means of
gestures. Displaying his right hand with the fingers outstretched he
would say, "That is a phantasy," then contracting the fingers a little,
"That is assent," then having closed the fist, "That is comprehension,"
then clasping the fist closely with the left hand, he would add, "That is
knowledge."
A notion which corresponds to our word concept was defined