A History of Freedom of Thought | Page 4

city called Constantinople and that comets are portents

signifying divine wrath, would not
[17] distinguish the nature of the evidence in the two cases. You may
still sometimes hear arguments amounting to this: since I believe in
Calcutta on authority, am I not entitled to believe in the Devil on
authority?
Now people at all times have been commanded or expected or invited
to accept on authority alone—the authority, for instance, of public
opinion, or a Church, or a sacred book—doctrines which are not proved
or are not capable of proof. Most beliefs about nature and man, which
were not founded on scientific observation, have served directly or
indirectly religious and social interests, and hence they have been
protected by force against the criticisms of persons who have the
inconvenient habit of using their reason. Nobody minds if his
neighbour disbelieves a demonstrable fact. If a sceptic denies that
Napoleon existed, or that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen,
he causes amusement or ridicule. But if he denies doctrines which
cannot be demonstrated, such as the existence of a personal God or the
immortality of the soul, he incurs serious disapprobation and at one
time he might have been put to death. Our mediaeval friend would have
only been called a fool if he doubted the existence of Constantinople,
but if he had questioned the significance of comets he
[18] might have got into trouble. It is possible that if he had been so
mad as to deny the existence of Jerusalem he would not have escaped
with ridicule, for Jerusalem is mentioned in the Bible.
In the Middle Ages a large field was covered by beliefs which authority
claimed to impose as true, and reason was warned off the ground. But
reason cannot recognize arbitrary prohibitions or barriers, without
being untrue to herself. The universe of experience is her province, and
as its parts are all linked together and interdependent, it is impossible
for her to recognize any territory on which she may not tread, or to
surrender any of her rights to an authority whose credentials she has not
examined and approved.
The uncompromising assertion by reason of her absolute rights

throughout the whole domain of thought is termed rationalism, and the
slight stigma which is still attached to the word reflects the bitterness of
the struggle between reason and the forces arrayed against her. The
term is limited to the field of theology, because it was in that field that
the self-assertion of reason was most violently and pertinaciously
opposed. In the same way free thought, the refusal of thought to be
controlled by any authority but its own, has a definitely theological
reference. Throughout
[19] the conflict, authority has had great advantages. At any time the
people who really care about reason have been a small minority, and
probably will be so for a long time to come. Reason’s only weapon has
been argument. Authority has employed physical and moral violence,
legal coercion and social displeasure. Sometimes she has attempted to
use the sword of her adversary, thereby wounding herself. Indeed the
weakest point in the strategical position of authority was that her
champions, being human, could not help making use of reasoning
processes and the result was that they were divided among themselves.
This gave reason her chance. Operating, as it were, in the enemy’s
camp and professedly in the enemy’s cause, she was preparing her own
victory.
It may be objected that there is a legitimate domain for authority,
consisting of doctrines which lie outside human experience and
therefore cannot be proved or verified, but at the same time cannot be
disproved. Of course, any number of propositions can be invented
which cannot be disproved, and it is open to any one who possesses
exuberant faith to believe them; but no one will maintain that they all
deserve credence so long as their falsehood is not demonstrated. And if
only some deserve credence, who, except reason,
[20] is to decide which? If the reply is, Authority, we are confronted by
the difficulty that many beliefs backed by authority have been finally
disproved and are universally abandoned. Yet some people speak as if
we were not justified in rejecting a theological doctrine unless we can
prove it false. But the burden of proof does not lie upon the rejecter. I
remember a conversation in which, when some disrespectful remark

was made about hell, a loyal friend of that establishment said
triumphantly, “But, absurd as it may seem, you cannot disprove it.” If
you were told that in a certain planet revolving round Sirius there is a
race of donkeys who talk the English language and spend their time in
discussing eugenics, you could not disprove the statement, but would it,
on that account, have any claim to