A Guide for the Religious Instruction of Jewish Youth | Page 4

is
also conscious that he exists not by himself, that he has not existed
from all eternity, that he is subject to changes, that even the simple
ideas, which compose his thoughts, are not produced by himself, but
acquired through his senses from external objects; and, in short, that he
depends upon various causes placed without himself, and undergoes
vicissitudes, which it is not in his power to remove. Therefore man has
not within himself the reason of his own existence, but he must trace it
to another, who is the Author of it. Now, this Author cannot have
received His own existence from another, if He is to be considered the
primary cause; otherwise we should fall into a succession of causes and
effects to infinity. Then, the true Author of our existence is one who
exists by Himself, and as such He is eternal, omnipotent, all-wise, etc.,
etc.; He is God.
VII. Another source, affording the proof of the existence of God, man
finds in himself when his intellectual faculties have attained a certain
degree of culture and maturity. He then knows himself to be a moral
being; that is to say, a being who, placed between good and evil, can, of
his own free will, adhere to the former and reject the latter, if he
follows the dictates of his reason. Then the moral sense awakens in his
mind the idea of a supreme blessing, of a progressive and infallible
moral perfection, of a future final accord between virtue and felicity,
and their necessary co-existence. Now, he cannot expect this supreme
blessing from anything that surrounds him in nature, because he does
not find in the latter the desired union of happiness with virtue,
enjoyment with merit. He must, therefore, seek it in a Supreme Cause
existing out of nature--in a Cause which should contain in itself the
type of the moral law, embrace the whole extent of that law with
infinite intelligence, and act up to its dictates with a powerful will. This
Supreme Cause is God.

CHAPTER II.
VIII. MAN has many advantages and privileges over all other creatures.
Not only can he, like other animals, perceive through his senses all the
surrounding objects, but he can compare with one another the
perceptions received, associate them together, separate them, and form
new ideas. He can know for what purposes things exist, investigate
their causes and effects, discern between good and evil, between just
and unjust; he alone can communicate his thoughts to others; he alone
can speak.
IX. Everything produced by an intelligent Author must be intended for
some purpose--must have a destination. Man, the noblest creature on
earth, must also have a destination. We shall arrive at a clear
knowledge of that destination, when we shall have considered the
powers and capabilities possessed by him; for the means with which
nature has endowed him, for the development of his activity, evidently
point out the goal which that activity is designed to attain.
X. Now, the capabilities that we discover in man are the
following:--Besides a body constructed with wonderful skill, but weak,
corruptible, mortal, man has within himself a vivifying principle, which
substantiates in him the knowledge of things with the aid of the senses,
renews in him perceptions once received, unites them, separates them,
and forms out of them new ideas. This thinking principle is certainly
different from the body, of which no part is apt to think, and is what we
call the soul; the act itself of thinking proceeds from a faculty of the
soul which we call intellect.
XI. But the soul can also judge, conclude from causes to effects,
distinguish between good and evil, between just and unjust, conceive
an idea of things never perceived through the senses; it can recognise
the supreme Author of the universe, it can adore God. This faculty of
the soul is called reason; intellect and reason are the principal or
superior faculties of the human soul.
XII. Reason points out good as a thing desirable, and evil as a thing to

be avoided; yet man feels within himself a desire or impulse towards all
that is pleasurable to the senses, although reason may represent it to
him as an evil. And, on the other hand, he is conscious of his perfect
freedom of choosing good, however disagreeable to the senses, and of
abhorring evil, however tempting it may appear; he has, then, the
faculty of directing his action to one or other of these two courses; his
soul is endowed with free-will.
XIII. A being endowed with intellect, reason, and free-will cannot be
composed of parts, because the operations proceeding from such
faculties presuppose a comparison of various relations with each other,
and a deduction of consequences from their principles; and these
operations require such