A Century of Wrong | Page 4

status of the
coloured man. The English under Exeter Hall have undoubtedly a
higher ideal as to the theoretical equality of men of all races; but on the
spot the arrogance of colour is often asserted as offensively by the
Briton as by the Boer. The difference between the two is, in short, that
the Boer has adjusted his practice to his belief, whereas we believe
what we do not practice. That the black population of the Transvaal is
conscious of being treated with exceeding brutality by the Boers is
disproved by the fact that for months past all the women and children
of the two Republics have been left at the absolute mercy of the natives
in the midst of whom they live.
The English reader will naturally turn with more interest to Mr. Reitz's
narrative of recent negotiations than to his observations upon the
hundred years of history which he says have taught the Dutch that there
is no justice to be looked for at the hands of a British Government. The
advocates of the war will be delighted to find that Mr. Reitz asserts in

the most uncompromising terms the right of the Transvaal to be
regarded as an Independent Sovereign International State. However
unpleasant this may be to Downing Street, the war has compelled the
Government to recognise the fact. When it began we were haughtily
told that there would be no declaration of war, nor would the Republics
be recognised as belligerents. The war had not lasted a month before
this vainglorious boast was falsified, and we were compelled to
recognise the Transvaal as a belligerent State. It is almost incredible
that even Sir William Harcourt should have fallen into the snare set for
him by Mr. Chamberlain in this matter. The contention that the
Transvaal cannot be an Independent Sovereign State because Article 4
of the Convention of 1884 required that all treaties with foreign Powers
should be submitted for assent to England may afford a technical plea
for assuming that it was not an Independent Sovereign International
State. But, as Mr. Reitz points out, no one questions the fact that
Belgium is an International Independent Sovereign State, although the
exercise of her sovereignty is limited by an international obligation to
maintain neutrality. A still stronger instance as proving the fact that the
status of a sovereign State is not affected by the limitation of the
exercise of its sovereignty is afforded by the limitation imposed by the
Treaty of Paris on the sovereign right of the Russian Empire to
maintain a fleet in the Black Sea. To forbid the Tsar to put an ironclad
on the sea which washes his southern coast was a far more drastic
limitation of the inalienable rights of an Independent International
Sovereign State than the provision that treaties affecting the interests of
another Power should be subject to the veto of that Power, but no one
has protested that Russia has lost her international status on account of
the limitation imposed by the Treaty of Paris. In like manner Mr. Reitz
argues that the Transvaal, being free to conduct its diplomacy, and to
make war, can fairly claim to be a Sovereign International State. The
assertion of this fact serves as an Ithuriel's spear to bring into clear
relief the significance of the revival by Mr. Chamberlain of the
Suzerainty of 1881. Upon this point Mr. Reitz gives us a plain
straightforward narrative, the justice and accuracy of which will not be
denied by anyone who, like Sir Edward Clarke, takes the trouble to
read the official dispatches.

I turn with more interest to Mr. Reitz's narrative of the precise
differences of opinion which led to the breaking-off of negotiations
between the two Governments. Mr. Chamberlain, it will be
remembered, said in his dispatch he had accepted nine-tenths of the
conditions laid down by the Boers if the five years' franchise was to be
conceded. What the tenth was which was not accepted Mr.
Chamberlain has never told us, excepting that it was "a matter of form"
which was "not worth a war." Readers of Mr. Reitz's narrative will see
that in the opinion of the Boers the sticking point was the question of
suzerainty. If Mr. Chamberlain would have endorsed Sir Alfred
Milner's declaration, and have said, as his High Commissioner did, that
the question about suzerainty was etymological rather than political,
and that he would say no more about it, following Lord Derby's policy
and abstaining from using a word which was liable to be misunderstood,
there would have been no war. So far as Mr. Reitz's authority goes we
are justified in saying that the war was brought about by the persistence
of Mr. Chamberlain in reviving the claim of suzerainty which had been
expressly surrendered in