A Candid Examination of Theism | Page 4

doctrine of evolutionary psychology be true.
35. The last three sections parenthetical. Necessary nature of the conclusion which follows from the last five sections.
CHAPTER V.
THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD.
36. Emphatic re-statement of the conclusion reached in the previous chapter. This conclusion shown to be of merely scientific, and not of logical conclusiveness. Preparation for considering the question in its purely logical form.
37. The logic of probability in general explained, and canon of interpretation enunciated.
38. Application of this canon to the particular case of Theism.
39. Exposition of the logical state of the question.
40. Exposition continued.
41. Result of the exposition; "Suspended Judgment" the only logical attitude of mind with regard to the question of Theism.
CHAPTER VI.
THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY.
42. Statement of the position to which the question of Theism has been reduced by the foregoing analysis.
43. Distinction between a scientific and a metaphysical teleology. Statement of the latter in legitimate terms. Criticism of this statement legitimately made on the side of Atheism as being gratuitous. Impartial judgment on this criticism.
44. Examination of the question as to whether the metaphysical system of teleology is really destitute of all rational support. Pleading of a supposed Theist in support of the system. The principle of correlation of general laws. The complexity of Nature.
45. Summary of the Theist's pleading, and judgment that it fairly removes from the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology the charge of the latter being gratuitous.
46. Examination of the degree of probability that is presented by the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology, comprising an examination of the Theistic objection to the scientific train of reasoning on account of its symbolism, and showing that a no less cogent objection lies against the metaphysical train of reasoning on account of its embodying the supposition of unknowable causes. Distinction between "inconceivability" in a formal or symbolical, and in a material or realisable sense. Reply of a supposed Atheist to the previous pleading of the supposed Theist. Herbert Spencer quoted on inconceivability of cosmic evolution as due to Mind.
47. Final judgment on the rational value of a metaphysical system of teleology. Distinction between "inconceivability" in an absolute and in a relative sense. Final judgment on the attitude of mind which it is rational to adopt towards the question of Theism. The desirability and the rationality of tolerance in this particular case.
CHAPTER VII.
GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
48. General summary of the whole essay.
49. Concluding remarks.
APPENDIX AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS.
APPENDIX.
A Critical Exposition of a Fallacy in Locke's use of the Argument against the possibility of Matter thinking on grounds of its being inconceivable that it should.
SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY I.
Examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Theistical Argument, and criticism to show that it is inadequate to sustain the doctrine of "Cosmic Theism" which Mr. Fiske endeavours to rear upon it.
SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY II.
A Critical Examination of the Rev. Professor Flint's work on "Theism".
SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY III.
On the Speculative Standing of Materialism.
SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY IV.
On the Final Mystery of Things.
* * * * *
THEISM.
* * * * *
CHAPTER I.
EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEISM.
§ 1. Few subjects have occupied so much attention among speculative thinkers as that which relates to the being of God. Notwithstanding, however, the great amount that has been written on this subject, I am not aware that any one has successfully endeavoured to approach it, on all its various sides, from the ground of pure reason alone, and thus to fix, as nearly as possible, the exact position which, in pure reason, this subject ought to occupy. Perhaps it will be thought that an exception to this statement ought to be made in favour of John Stuart Mill's posthumous essay on Theism; but from my great respect for this author, I should rather be inclined to regard that essay as a criticism on illogical arguments, than as a careful or matured attempt to formulate the strictly rational status of the question in all its bearings. Nevertheless, as this essay is in some respects the most scientific, just, and cogent, which has yet appeared on the subject of which it treats, and as anything which came from the pen of that great and accurate thinker is deserving of the most serious attention, I shall carefully consider his views throughout the course of the following pages.
Seeing then that, with this partial exception, no competent writer has hitherto endeavoured once for all to settle the long-standing question as to the rational probability of Theism, I cannot but feel that any attempt, however imperfect, to do this, will be welcome to thinkers of every school--the more so in view of the fact that the prodigious rapidity which of late years has marked the advance both of physical and of speculative science, has afforded highly valuable data for assisting us towards a reasonable and, I think, a final decision as to