A Candid Examination of Theism | Page 9

is essential to an hypothesis that, if admitted, it
should at least remove the difficulty and account for the facts. But it
does not account for mind to refer our mind to a prior mind for its
origin. The problem remains unsolved, nay, rather increased."
Nevertheless, I think that it is open to a Theist to answer, "My object is
not to explain the existence of Mind in the abstract, any more than it is
my object to explain Existence itself in the abstract--to either of which
absurd attempts Mr. Mill's reasoning would be equally applicable;--but
I seek for an explanation of my own individual finite mind, which I
know to have had a beginning in time, and which, therefore, in
accordance with the widest and most complete analogy that experience
supplies, I believe to have been caused. And if there is no other
objection to my believing in Intelligence as the cause of my
intelligence, than that I cannot prove my own intelligence caused, then
I am satisfied to let the matter rest here; for as every argument must
have some basis of assumption to stand upon, I am well pleased to find
that the basis in this case is the most solid which experience can supply,
viz.,--the law of causation. Fully admitting that it does not account for
Mind (in the abstract) to refer one mind to a prior mind for its origin;
yet my hypothesis, if admitted, does account for the fact that my mind
exists; and this is all that my hypothesis is intended to cover. For to
endeavour to explain the existence of an eternal mind, could only be
done by those who do not understand the meaning of these words."
Now, I think that this reply to Mr. Mill, on the part of a theist, would so
far be legitimate; the theistic hypothesis does supply a provisional
explanation of the existence of known minds, and it is, therefore, an
explanation which, in lieu of a better, a theist may be allowed to retain.
But a theist may not be allowed to confuse this provisional explanation

of his own mind's existence with that of the existence of Mind in the
abstract; he must not be allowed to suppose that, by thus hypothetically
explaining the existence of known minds, he is thereby establishing a
probability in favour of that hypothetical cause, an Unknown Mind.
Only if he has some independent reason to infer that such an Unknown
Mind exists, could such a probability be made out, and his hypothetical
explanation of known mind become of more value than a guess. In
other words, although the theistic hypothesis supplies a possible
explanation of known mind, we have no reason to conclude that it is the
true explanation, unless other reasons can be shown to justify, on
independent grounds, the validity of the theistic hypothesis. Hence it is
manifestly absurd to adduce this explanation as evidence of the
hypothesis on which it rests--to argue that Theism must therefore be
true; because we assume it to be so, in order to explain known mind, as
distinguished from Mind. If it be answered, We are justified in
assuming Theism true, because we are justified in assuming that known
mind can only have been caused by an unknown mind, and hence that
Mind must somewhere be self-existing, then this is to lead us to the
second objection to the above syllogism.
§ 12. And this second objection is of a most serious nature. "Mind can
only be caused by Mind," and, therefore, Mind must either be uncaused,
or caused by a Mind. What is our warrant for ranking this assertion?
Where is the proof that nothing can have caused a mind except another
mind? Answer to this question there is none. For aught that we can ever
know to the contrary, anything within the whole range of the Possible
may be competent to produce a self-conscious intelligence--and to
assume that Mind is so far an entity sui generis, that it must either be
self-existing, or derived from another mind which is self-existing, is
merely to beg the whole question as to the being of a God. In other
words, if we can prove that the order of existence to which Mind
belongs, is so essentially different from that order, or those orders, to
which all else belongs, as to render it abstractedly impossible that the
latter can produce the former--if we can prove this, we have likewise
proved the existence of a Deity. But this is just the point in dispute, and
to set out with a bare affirmation of it is merely to beg the question and
to abandon the discussion. Doubtless, by the mere act of consulting

their own consciousness, the fact now in dispute appears to some
persons self-evident. But