A Candid Examination of Theism | Page 6

real, all that the fact entitles the thinker to
affirm is, that it is impossible for him, by any effort of thinking, to rid
himself of the persuasion that God exists; he is not entitled to affirm
that this persuasion is necessarily bound up with the constitution of the
human mind. Or, as Mill puts it, "One man cannot by proclaiming with
ever so much confidence that he perceives an object, convince other
people that they see it too.... When no claim is set up to any peculiar
gift, but we are told that all of us are as capable of seeing what he sees,
feeling what he feels, nay, that we actually do so, and when the utmost
effort of which we are capable fails to make us aware of what we are
told, we perceive this supposed universal faculty of intuition is but
'The Dark Lantern of the Spirit Which none see by but those who bear
it.'"
It is thus, I think, abundantly certain that the present argument must,
from its very nature, be powerless as an argument to anyone save its
assertor; as a matter of fact, the alleged necessity of thought is not
universal; it is peculiar to those who employ the argument.
And now, it is but just to go one step further and to question whether
the alleged necessity of thought is, in any case and properly speaking, a
real necessity. Unless those who advance the present argument are the
victims of some mental aberration, it is overwhelmingly improbable
that their minds should differ in a fundamental and important attribute
from the minds of the vast majority of their species. Or, to continue the
above quotation, "They may fairly be asked to consider, whether it is
not more likely that they are mistaken as to the origin of an impression
in their minds, than that others are ignorant of the very existence of an
impression in theirs." No doubt it is true that education and habits of
thought may so stereotype the intellectual faculties, that at last what is
conceivable to one man or generation may not be so to another;[2] but
to adduce this consideration in this place would clearly be but to
destroy the argument from the intuitive necessity of believing in a God.

Lastly, although superfluous, it may be well to point out that even if the
impossibility of conceiving the negation of God were an universal law
of human mind--which it certainly is not--the fact of his existence
could not be thus proved. Doubtless it would be felt to be much more
probable than it now is--as probable, for instance, if not more probable,
than is the existence of an external world;--but still it would not be
necessarily true.
§ 7. The argument from the general consent of mankind is so clearly
fallacious, both as to facts and principles, that I shall pass it over and
proceed at once to the last of the untenable arguments--that, namely,
from the existence of a First Cause. And here I should like to express
myself indebted to Mr. Mill for the following ideas:--"The cause of
every change is a prior change; and such it cannot but be; for if there
were no new antecedent, there would be no new consequent. If the state
of facts which brings the phenomenon into existence, had existed
always or for an indefinite duration, the effect also would have existed
always or been produced an indefinite time ago. It is thus a necessary
part of the fact of causation, within the sphere of experience, that the
causes as well as the effects had a beginning in time, and were
themselves caused. It would seem, therefore, that our experience,
instead of furnishing an argument for a first cause, is repugnant to it;
and that the very essence of causation, as it exists within the limits of
our knowledge, is incompatible with a First Cause."
The rest of Mr. Mill's remarks upon the First Cause argument are
tolerably obvious, and had occurred to me before the publication of his
essay. I shall, however, adhere to his order of presenting them.
"But it is necessary to look more particularly into this matter, and
analyse more closely the nature of the causes of which mankind have
experience. For if it should turn out that though all causes have a
beginning, there is in all of them a permanent element which had no
beginning, this permanent element may with some justice be termed a
first or universal cause, inasmuch as though not sufficient of itself to
cause anything, it enters as a con-cause into all causation."
He then shows that the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy supplies

us with such a datum, and thus the conclusion easily follows--"It would
seem, then, that the